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HOW WAS THAT REASONABLE? THE 
MISGUIDED DEVELOPMENT OF QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY AND EXCESSIVE FORCE BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
Abstract: Under the qualified immunity doctrine, current policy shields law en-
forcement officers who utilize excessive force against ordinary American citi-
zens. As a result, police departments and enforcement officers lack incentives to 
change their behavior, leaving victims and grieving families powerless in the face 
of an unforgiving legal doctrine that provides little to no justice. This Note ex-
plores the creation and development of the qualified immunity doctrine within 
the policing context and argues that its near-impossible and unjust standards have 
been problematically overextended and drastically need reform by the Supreme 
Court. The countless lives lost at the hands of those who are meant to serve and 
protect are not in vain—they serve as the clarion call for legal change. 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent killings of unarmed black men by white police officers has re-
ceived renewed media attention, highlighting the need to change current laws 
to implement better policing practices and policies that promote accountability 
and racial equality.1 2018 proved there is no relent in this trend—the Sacra-
mento County District Attorney recently declined to charge two police officers 
who fatally shot a twenty-two year-old unarmed black male, Stephon Clark, in 
his grandmother’s backyard.2 Increasingly frequent videos of police brutality 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Jasmine C. Lee et al., At Least 88 Cities Have Had Protests in the Past 13 Days Over Police 
Killings of Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/07/16/us/
protesting-police-shootings-of-blacks.html [https://perma.cc/ES6C-XMWS] (showing public reactions 
to police violence against black citizens through protests in various cities across the nation); Haeyoun 
Park & Jasmine C. Lee, Looking for Accountability in Police-Involved Deaths of Blacks, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/07/12/us/looking-for-accountability-in-
police-involved-deaths-of-blacks.html [https://perma.cc/KP4U-56DE] (showing raw footage and 
analyzing thirteen recent high-profile police excessive force cases that were caught on video); see also 
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, BLACK LIVES MATTER: ELIMINATING RACIAL INEQUITY IN THE CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2015), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
Black-Lives-Matter.pdf [https://perma.cc/684X-2RJR] (noting how minorities are the target of harsher 
treatment by police, prosecutors, and judges); Ryan Gabrielson et al., Deadly Force, in Black and 
White, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-force-in-black-and-
white [https://perma.cc/49L6-UB2A] (explaining that young black males are much more at risk of 
being killed by police than white males). 
 2 See Christina Caron, East Pittsburgh Police Kill Antwon Rose, Unarmed 17-Year-Old, as He 
Flees, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/us/pittsburgh-police-
shooting.html [https://perma.cc/Y4UK-PW6H] (showing how police killed unarmed teenager Antwon 
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against black men have captivated audiences across America and shed light on 
the injustices faced by minorities.3 Unfortunately, despite seemingly conclu-
sive video evidence, officers are rarely charged or indicted in these types of 
cases, and conviction rates against police are even more bleak.4 In fifteen sepa-
rate high-profile police killings of unarmed black men from 2014 to 2016, only 
three officers were criminally convicted and seven officers were never even 
charged.5 Data analysis regarding excessive force of police officers is vastly 
                                                                                                                           
Rose); Jose A. Del Real, No Charges for Police in Fatal Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2019, at A15 
(detailing the case of Stephon Clark who was killed by two police officers in March 2018); John Sullivan 
et al., Four Years in a Row, Police Nationwide Fatally Shoot Nearly 1,000 People, WASH. POST (Feb. 
12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/four-years-in-a-row-police-nationwide-
fatally-shoot-nearly-1000-people/2019/02/07/0cb3b098-020f-11e9-9122-82e98f91ee6f_story.html?
utm_term=.3a6c6cfc4e14 [https://perma.cc/N77Z-5BRC] (proving that around one thousand people 
die annually from police shootings); Julie Tate et al., 998 People Have Been Shot And Killed by Police 
in 2018, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/
police-shootings-2018/?utm_term=.f62945024587 [https://perma.cc/SAF4-PDWR] (showing each 
instance of deadly police shootings in 2018); see also Matthew Haag, Dallas Police Officer Kills Her 
Neighbor in His Apartment, Saying She Mistook It for Her Own, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/us/dallas-police-shooting-botham-shem-jean.html [https://perma.cc/
RF76-97X9] (detailing how a Dallas police officer entered an unarmed black neighbor’s apartment, 
fatally shooting him because she mistook the apartment for her own). 
 3 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., SHARP RACIAL DIVISIONS IN REACTIONS TO BROWN, GARNER DE-
CISIONS 2 (2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2014/12/12-8-14-Police-
Race-release.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZCC-59NE] (showing that, in response to the Daniel Pantaleo 
grand jury hearing in the Eric Garner case, only forty-seven percent of white people polled thought the 
wrong decision was reached by the grand jury, while ninety percent of black people polled thought the 
wrong decision was reached by the grand jury); Glenn Bain, Nearly Two-Thirds of New Yorkers Be-
lieve Officer Daniel Pantaleo Should be Charged in the Death of Eric Garner: Poll, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Dec. 13, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/two-thirds-new-yorkers-wanted-
charges-eric-garner-case-article-1.2043869 [https://perma.cc/PQM4-RMDQ] (showing that a majority 
of New Yorkers thought the grand jury reached the wrong decision in the case against Daniel Pan-
taleo); Mercy Benzaquen et al., Black Lives Upended by Policing: The Raw Videos Sparking Outrage, 
N.Y. TIMES (April 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/19/us/police-videos-
race.html [https://perma.cc/KE3Z-TLEF] (highlighting the video footage of recent mistreatment of 
black men by police). 
 4 See Taylor Kate Brown, The Cases Where US Police Have Faced Killing Charges, BBC NEWS 
(Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30339943 [https://perma.cc/XU6V-8F2R] 
(showing that police are rarely arrested or charged for their violent crimes); James C. McKinley Jr. & 
Al Baker, A System, with Exceptions, That Favors the Police in Fatalities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2014, 
at A1 (arguing that police officers benefit from favorable treatment under the justice system); Madison 
Park, Police Shootings: Trails, Convictions Are Rare for Officers, CNN (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.
cnn.com/2017/05/18/us/police-involved-shooting-cases/index.html [https://perma.cc/6RZQ-4GB2] 
(providing statistics on the low conviction rates for police officers involved in killings). But see Rich-
ard Pérez-Peña, Officer Indicted in Shooting Death of Unarmed Man, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2015, at 
A1 (showing an officer was indicted for shooting and killing an unarmed black motorist). 
 5 See Jasmine C. Lee & Haeyoun Park, 15 Black Lives Ended in Confrontations with Police. 3 
Officers Convicted., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/17/us/
black-deaths-police.html [https://perma.cc/VAE9-DQXR] (showing the outcomes of fifteen different 
cases of police violence and excessive force claims from 2014 to 2016). During the fall of 2014 alone, 
four separate, highly publicized cases arose involving unarmed black males killed by police. See, e.g., 
David Goodman & Al Baker, New York Officer Facing No Charges in Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
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insufficient, but the available information does not bode well for minorities.6 
Such disconcerting information may lead one to wonder what the current state 
of the law is governing a police officer’s use of deadly force and how so many 
seemingly unjustified civilian killings of unarmed black men occur by those 
tasked with serving and protecting those same civilians.7 The answer is found 
amongst a long line of confusing and oftentimes contradictory cases wrought 
with misunderstandings and misconceptions.8 
Because criminal prosecutions of police for excessive force are scarce, a 
plaintiff’s most plausible avenue for redress is often a civil suit for monetary 
                                                                                                                           
Dec. 4, 2014, at A1 (detailing protests that took place in response to officer Daniel Pantaleo, the man 
responsible for the death of Eric Garner, not being indicted by a grand jury); Elahe Izadi, Ohio Wal-Mart 
Surveillance Video Shows Police Shooting and Killing John Crawford III, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/09/25/ohio-wal-mart-surveillance-video-
shows-police-shooting-and-killing-john-crawford-iii [https://perma.cc/UC6E-5QBA] (discussing the 
video of the police shooting of John Crawford III in Wal-Mart); Elahe Izadi & Peter Holley, Video 
Shows Cleveland Officer Shooting 12-Year-Old Tamir Rice Within Seconds, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2014/11/26/officials-release-video-
names-in-fatal-police-shooting-of-12-year-old-cleveland-boy [https://perma.cc/EDJ7-BVLL] (discuss-
ing the video of the moments leading up to the fatal shooting of a twelve-year-old black child, Tamir 
Rice, in Cleveland, Ohio); Eliott C. McLaughlin, What We Know About Michael Brown's Shooting, 
CNN (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/11/us/missouri-ferguson-michael-brown-what-
we-know/index.html [https://perma.cc/CL4Y-E5M7] (detailing the facts known about the police 
shooting of African American unarmed teenager Michael Brown). 
 6 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ARREST-RELATED DEATHS, 2003–2009—STATISTICAL 
TABLES 6 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ard0309st.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3HN-ZYN3] 
(showing half the people killed by police in recent years were either black or Hispanic); Paul Butler, The 
White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245, 252 (2010) (showing that unrestricted police au-
thority is frequently exercised in low income minority areas); Rob Barry & Coulter Jones, Hundreds of 
Police Killings Are Uncounted in Federal Stats, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/hundreds-of-police-killings-are-uncounted-in-federal-statistics-1417577504 [https://perma.cc/
KK99-QJVA] (showing deficiencies in the way police killings are counted); Reuben Fischer-Baum, 
Nobody Knows How Many Americans the Police Kill Each Year, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 19, 2014), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-many-americans-the-police-kill-each-year/ [https://perma.cc/
XQZ9-8737] (illustrating problems in the way the FBI keeps track of police killings). 
 7 See Rob Arthur et al., Shot by Cops and Forgotten, VICE NEWS (Dec. 11, 2017), https://news.
vice.com/en_ca/article/xwvv3a/shot-by-cops [https://perma.cc/4PEW-8V7V] (showing that police 
shootings of Americans are twice as frequent as actually reported); Carl Bialik, Why Are So Many 
Black Americans Killed by Police?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 28, 2016), https://fivethirtyeight.com/
features/why-are-so-many-black-americans-killed-by-police/ [https://perma.cc/S2XL-6KM6] (dis-
cussing different rationales and theories on why police kill so many black people); Why Do US Police 
Keep Killing Unarmed Black Men?, BBC NEWS (May 26, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-
canada-32740523 [https://perma.cc/677E-J5LK] (reporting expert opinions on the recent uptick in 
shootings by police officers of unarmed civilians). 
 8 See Graham v. Connor (Graham III), 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding that an objective rea-
sonableness test under the Fourth Amendment is the proper analysis for investigatory police stops); 
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (discussing the constitutionality of excessive force in a 
policing context for the first time); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802 (1982) (expanding the 
doctrine of qualified immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553 (1967) (creating the doctrine of 
qualified immunity); see also infra notes 53–95 and accompanying text. 
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damages.9 Civil actions are frequently brought against police officers and police 
departments for use of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”).10 To 
successfully bring § 1983 claims, plaintiffs must precisely state the constitu-
tional right that was violated by the police officer’s use of force against them.11 
Commonly, the infringed constitutional right identified by plaintiffs is found in 
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures.12 Sadly, this method of action has proved futile for all but a few plain-
tiffs, largely due to the doctrine of qualified immunity.13 
Qualified immunity protects police officers from any and all liability in 
civil suits if their actions do not violate known and “clearly established” 
laws.14 The divergent rationales for qualified immunity are holding police ac-
countable when they abuse their power, and shielding police officers and their 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1773, 
1798 n.145 (2016) (suggesting the lack of criminal prosecutions for police may be due to mutual rela-
tionships between prosecutors and police or impossibly high standards of proof for plaintiffs); Madi-
son Park, Police Shootings: Trials, Convictions Are Rare for Officers, CNN (Mar. 27, 2018), https://
www.cnn.com/2017/05/18/us/police-involved-shooting-cases/index.html [https://perma.cc/JGC5-
JDVJ] (providing statistics on the low conviction rate for police officers when they are involved in 
killings). 
 10 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see Alan W. Clarke, The Ku Klux Klan Act and the Civil Rights 
Revolution: How Civil Rights Litigation Came to Regulate Police and Correctional Officer Miscon-
duct, 7 SCHOLAR 151, 152 (2005) (“Section 1983 . . . is the workhorse of modern civil rights litiga-
tion.”). Section 1983 states, in relevant part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other prop-
er proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
 11 See Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (stating the first question for a qualified immuni-
ty analysis is what constitutional right was infringed, if any at all); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 
140 (1979) (stating plaintiffs must identify the precise constitutional violation with which the police 
officer is charged). 
 12 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Mullenix v. Luna (Mullenix IV), 136 S. Ct. 305, 312 (2015) (mak-
ing a determination of qualified immunity under the Fourth Amendment); Saucier, 553 U.S. at 194 
(utilizing the Fourth Amendment analysis); Graham III, 490 U.S. at 388 (using an objective reasona-
bleness test based off the Fourth Amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment clearly governs arrests or seizures, which is categorized by stopping someone and 
prohibiting them from freely walking away). 
 13 See Cover, supra note 9, at 1799 (arguing that a revived excessive force standard is needed 
because the Fourth Amendment places few restraints on an officer’s decision to use force on citizens). 
 14 See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (stating qualified immunity protects police 
from civil suit “insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
rights of which a reasonable person would have known” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818 (1982))). 
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employers from unnecessary distractions.15 Qualified immunity is applied to 
protect police officers in instances where their use of force may be questiona-
ble, but if the officer’s actions were unreasonable, then qualified immunity is 
not available as a defense.16 So long as the officer’s actions were based upon a 
reasonable misunderstanding, even the loss of an innocent life cannot stop that 
officer from raising a successful qualified immunity defense.17 
If a plaintiff can clear the first major hurdle of § 1983 by proving that an 
officer is not entitled to qualified immunity, the next hurdle is proving that the 
officer’s use of force was objectively unreasonable.18 There is a lack of clarity, 
however, in considering what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable use of 
force.19 The test for reasonableness in § 1983 claims concerning Fourth 
Amendment violations requires consideration of all the facts from the view-
point of a reasonable officer at the time the force was exerted.20 The test for 
reasonableness, however, does not consider an officer’s ill intentions or bad 
motivations underlying their use of force.21 If an officer is found to have acted 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231; Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206. The distractions alluded to by the 
Court include harassment due to insubstantial claims against government officials, and having to fo-
cus on defending a lawsuit instead of the assumed duties of a police officer. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. 
 16 See, e.g., Headwaters Forest Def. v. Humbold, 276 F.3d 1125, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (illustrating 
a case where police applied pepper spray in nonviolent protestors’ eyes with cotton swabs); Deorle v. 
Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1275–76 (9th Cir. 2001) (illustrating a case where a police officer, without 
warning, shot an unarmed individual in the head with a beanbag gun resulting in the loss of the indi-
vidual’s eye). 
 17 See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (stating the officer’s mistake is protected 
from liability if it was reasonable); see also Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (holding that qualified immunity 
protects police if their mistake is one of law, fact, or “based on mixed questions of law and fact” 
(quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting))). 
 18 See Graham v. Connor (Graham III), 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding that an “objective 
reasonableness” test is used to analyze a police officer’s use of force). See generally Rachel A. Har-
mon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (2008) (arguing that current 
excessive force doctrine privileges police by incorporating and fostering racist biases, and prohibiting 
inquiry into the police officer’s state of mind). The reasonableness test involves weighing the plain-
tiff’s interest in not being unreasonably searched or stopped with the government’s opposing interest. 
Graham III, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 19 Harmon, supra note 18, at 1127. After Tennessee v. Garner, lower courts applied differing 
rules for excessive force. 471 U.S. 1 (1985); see, e.g., Kuha v. City of Minnetonka, 365 F.3d 590, 598 
n.2 (8th Cir. 2004); Martin v. Dishong, 57 F. App’x 153, 155 (4th Cir. 2003); Abraham v. Raso, 183 
F.3d 279, 288 (3rd Cir. 1999). 
 20 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1985). Factors to be considered with the totality of 
circumstances are “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to 
the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 
arrest by flight.” Graham III, 490 U.S. at 396. Triers of fact are encouraged to recognize that police 
are forced to make difficult decisions about what level of force is necessary during tense, fast-moving, 
and risky situations. See id. at 396–97. 
 21 Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978); see Graham III, 490 U.S. at 396–97 (giving 
no weight to the officer’s intentions, good or bad). 
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unreasonably, then they are liable for monetary damages.22 When considering 
the gaps provided by the reasonableness test in judicial decisions, the attempt 
to shield officers with qualified immunity results in a betrayal of the purposes 
underlying § 1983 legislation.23 The intersection of qualified immunity and 
excessive force doctrine has rendered § 1983 plaintiffs highly vulnerable and 
unlikely to succeed on the merits.24 
This Note explores the case law and policy that created the doctrines of 
qualified immunity and excessive force, which are increasingly used as a 
shield for police officers who forcibly violate constitutional rights.25 Part I of 
this Note provides the historical background and context of § 1983 claims as 
well as the gradual doctrinal developments of excessive force and liability in 
the policing context.26 Part II discusses the judicially created standards and 
tests applied in determining qualified immunity and excessive force, and 
shows how the doctrines have evolved over the years to increase protections 
for the police.27 Part III then argues that the U.S. Supreme Court has gone 
astray from the original intent of the legislation and has rendered victims of 
excessive police force helpless.28 Part III also advocates for the application of a 
new method in deciding § 1983 litigation and suggests ways in which the 
Court should proceed in its application.29 
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
The language in § 1983, which codifies many provisions of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871 (“Act”), states that any person acting under the apparent authority of 
law is liable when they deprive another person of a constitutional right, privi-
                                                                                                                           
 22 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional 
Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 135–36 (suggesting the award of money damages is the best award an 
excessive-force victim can expect). 
 23 See Allen H. Denson, Neither Clear Nor Established: The Problem with Objective Legal Rea-
sonableness, 59 ALA. L. REV. 747, 750 (2008) (stating that inconsistent applications of qualified im-
munity have resulted from trying to shield police from the burden of litigation). 
 24 See Karen Blum et al., Qualified Immunity Developments: Not Much Hope Left for Plaintiffs, 
29 TOURO L. REV. 633, 657–58 (2013) (suggesting that qualified immunity is a confusing doctrine, 
and a significant threat to plaintiffs). Some scholars argue that police are twice as protected because of 
the two reasonableness tests—clearly established law and excessive force—that shield police. See 
John P. Gross, Judge, Jury, and Executioner: The Excessive Use of Deadly Force by Police Officers, 
21 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 155, 165 (2016) (same). See generally Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonable-
ness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117 (2009) (arguing police in a Fourth Amendment excessive force case are 
protected from liability by two layers of reasonableness). 
 25 See infra notes 30–218 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 30–95 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 96–160 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 161–218 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 161–218 and accompanying text. 
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lege, or immunity.30 The Act was enacted in response to diminishing law and 
order in the South, largely due to Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) violence against black 
people and those who sympathized with them.31 Section 1 of the Act dealt with 
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment and was later codified at § 1983.32 The 
intention of the Act was plainly stated in the legislation’s title, “An Act to En-
force the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, and for other Purposes” and its application was eventually ex-
panded to include the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.33 Following its enactment and the Civil War, though, few 
claims were brought in the late 1800s due to restrictive United States Supreme 
Court interpretations of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment 
and “under the color of state law” limitations.34 It wasn’t until 1961, during the 
                                                                                                                           
 30 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). The Civil Rights Act of 1871 (“the Act”) is also commonly referred 
to as the Ku Klux Klan Act. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 164 (1970) (quoting 
congressional debates of the forty-second Congress and stating that Section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan 
Act was limited to depravation of rights committed under the color or law); Martin J. Jaron, Jr., The 
Threat of Personal Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Does It Interfere with the Perfor-
mance of State and Local Government?, 13 URB. LAW. 1, 1 n.1 (1981). 
 31 See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 337 (1983). The Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) used deceptive 
appearances as state officers, frequently collaborating with state or local governments, to frighten and 
murder countless freed slaves and anyone who opposed the KKK’s racist agenda. See Clarke, supra 
note 10, at 154–55 (2005) (explaining how KKK members used their position to commit injustices 
against blacks and anyone who sympathized with them); see also Eric Foner, RECONSTRUCTION: 
AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 119–21, 342–43, 425–28 (1988) (detailing 
atrocities done by Southerners to newly-freed slaves and their supporters in the late nineteenth centu-
ry). Merely a month after President Ulysses S. Grant called upon Congress to address the frequent 
violent, lawless, and unpunished acts of the KKK, Congress quickly passed the Act. See Briscoe, 460 
U.S. at 337. During legislative debates, descriptions of the terrors inflicted by the KKK on black peo-
ple and white supporters went on for hours: “arson, robbery, whippings, shootings, murders, and other 
forms of violence and intimidation.” Id. Legislators reasoned that KKK members and their supporters 
controlled or influenced state law enforcement to the extent that their crimes went unpunished. See id. 
Similar to the “blue wall of silence,” KKK members were bound to protect other members by perjur-
ing themselves or violating their oaths as jurors. See id. State law enforcement’s inability to punish 
KKK members caused legislators to provide a federal remedy that protected the right to equal protec-
tion of the laws. See id. at 338. 
 32 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 358 (1990) (describing the history of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961) (same). The Act provided for 
the invalidation of state laws that infringed constitutional rights, offered a solution when state law was 
insufficient, and provided a federal cause of action because state actions were not practically available 
as an option. See Monroe 365 U.S. at 173–74. The Act was revised and reorganized within revised 
statutes. Jaron, supra note 30, at 1 n.1. Section 1 of the Act became 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Eric P. Gifford, 
Comment, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Social Worker Immunity: A Cause of Action Denied, 26 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 1013, 1015 (1995). 
 33 Pub. L. No. 42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Monroe, 365 
U.S. at 171. The Act was a federal remedy that did not preclude any state remedies, and state remedies 
need not be pursued to render the Act available for plaintiffs. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183. 
 34 See Michael S. DiBattista, Note, A Force to Be Reckoned With: Confronting the (Still) Unre-
solved Questions of Excessive Force Jurisprudence After Kingsley, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
203, 208 (2017) (stating that the post-Civil War United States Supreme Court “narrowly interpreted 
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civil rights movement, that the Court revived this statute.35 Section A of this Part 
describes the history and context of various types of immunity, and how the Su-
preme Court applied it to law enforcement and municipalities.36 Section B shows 
how the doctrine of qualified immunity was created, and tracks its early devel-
opments.37 Section C explains how the doctrine of excessive force became a fac-
tor at common law for police use of force against civilians.38 
A. Law Enforcement & Municipal Liability 
In 1961, in Monroe v. Pape, the United States Supreme Court considered 
municipal liability for § 1983 violations.39 Prior to this decision, state and local 
law enforcement officers often were not subjected to § 1983 claims unless they 
acted within their employment capacity.40 The plaintiff in this case, Mr. Mon-
roe, brought a § 1983 claim against the police and the city stating that both 
entities acted under the color of the law and effectively denied Mr. Monroe his 
                                                                                                                           
Congress’s power under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourth Amendment”); see, e.g., United States 
v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876) (showing that a private conspiracy to violate constitutional rights 
of another individual lacks the requisite component of state action); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 
(16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873) (holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause only applies to the rights 
of United States citizens). 
 35 Clarke, supra note 10, at 156. 
 36 See infra notes 39–52 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 53–74 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 75–95 and accompanying text. 
 39 365 U.S. at 191–92 (1961). In Monroe, thirteen Chicago police officers broke into a home 
without a search warrant or arrest warrant early in the morning, forced a family from their beds, and 
made the parents stand naked in their living room in front of their children. Id. at 169. The police then 
scoured every room, damaging furniture and emptying all containers. Id. The father, James Monroe, 
was detained for over ten hours and was questioned about a recent murder. Id. He was never brought 
before a judge, although some were available, and was not allowed to contact his family or an attor-
ney. Id. He was later released without any criminal charges filed against him. Id. 
 40 Clarke, supra note 10, at 163. The Act was narrowly interpreted to only allow claims against 
officers or officials when state law expressly enumerated their actions. See Eric H. Zagrans, ‘Under 
Color of’ What Law?: A Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REV. 499, 524–25 
(1985) (suggesting the Court misinterpreted legislative intent for the “under the color of law” re-
quirement under the Civil Rights Act of 1871). An action taken “under the color of state law” is a 
misuse of power, “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is 
clothed with the authority of state law.” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941). The Court 
thoroughly discussed the “color of law” distinction in its 1913 decision Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City 
of Los Angeles. 227 U.S. 278, 287 (1913). There, the Court dealt with the argument that the Four-
teenth Amendment only applied to acts done by state officers within the narrow confines of their pre-
scribed job duties, and did not extend to abuses of power committed by state officers in excess of their 
prescribed duties. Id. The Court disagreed with that interpretation, and instead held that when a state 
officer, acting under an assertion of state power, commits a wrong that would violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the officer is presumed to possess the authority of the state. See id. at 288–89 (stating an 
officer cannot violate someone’s constitutional rights by acting under an assumption of state power 
while simultaneously denying that power for the purpose of committing the wrong). 
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constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities.41 After an exhaustive discus-
sion on the legislative intent of the forty-second Congress, which passed the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871, the United States Supreme Court held that state law 
enforcement officials could be held liable in federal court for violations of 
someone’s constitutional rights, regardless of whether those actions may also 
be brought in state court for violations of state law.42 
Because Monroe concerned only state law enforcement officials, the Su-
preme Court felt the need to revisit similar liability issues concerning federal 
law enforcement agents in 1971 with Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics.43 In Bivens, the plaintiff, brought a damage claim 
against federal narcotics agents alleging that both their arrest and search were 
conducted without a warrant and the officers used unreasonable force.44 Creat-
ing what are referred to now as Bivens claims or Bivens actions, the majority 
held that federal remedies are available to citizens when federal agents violate 
their constitutional rights, but the Court limited the decision to Fourth 
Amendment violations.45 Since its decision in Bivens, however, the Supreme 
Court has expanded Bivens to include Fifth Amendment and Eighth Amend-
ment violations, making it a “functional equivalent of § 1983” claims.46 
The Supreme Court then dealt with the liabilities of municipalities in 
1978, in Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York.47 After 
re-examining the legislative intent of the forty-second Congress, the Court 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 170. The police argued § 1983 did not apply because state law already 
prohibited the conduct and provided plaintiffs an avenue for remedy. Id. at 172. The police further 
reasoned one could not act under the color of the law while simultaneously violating the law. Id. 
 42 See id. at 172, 183. See generally Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 244–820 (1871) (detailing 
congressional debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1871). 
 43 See 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). The facts in Bivens were similar to the facts of Monroe—Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics agents entered an apartment in New York without an arrest warrant, search war-
rant, or probable cause, handcuffed Mr. Bivens in front of his wife and children, and then proceeded 
to hastily search the apartment. Id. at 389. Compare id., with Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169. The federal 
agents then booked Mr. Bivens at the courthouse where he was interrogated and strip-searched. 
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. 
 44 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. The Court implied that Mr. Bivens complaint also stated that the fed-
eral agents had no probable cause, although his complaint did not expressly state that. Id. at 389 n.1. 
 45 Id. at 392, 394. The Court stated the Fourth Amendment limited federal power irrespective of 
the state punishing the same act, if done by a private citizen. Id. at 392. The Fourth Amendment se-
cures an unqualified right not to be unreasonably searched and seized by federal agents. Id. A Bivens 
action is the federal equivalent to a § 1983 claim, but is not applicable to state officers or local munic-
ipalities. See Denson, supra note 23, at 750 n.23. The distinguishing factor between a Bivens claim 
and a § 1983 claim is that federal statute violations or other constitutional violations besides the 
Fourth Amendment were not available in a Bivens claim. Clark, supra note 10, at 171. 
 46 Clark, supra note 10, at 171; see, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (concerning an 
Eighth Amendment violation); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (concerning a Fifth Amend-
ment violation). The Court’s rationale has developed such that the relevant question for § 1983 claims, 
applicable to state officers and municipalities, and a Bivens action, only applicable federal officers, are 
the same. Denson, supra note 23, at 750 n.23. 
 47 See generally 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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concluded that legislators intended the term “person” in the Act to include lo-
cal governments and municipalities.48 The Court, however, somewhat limited 
its holding by adding a causation requirement for municipalities.49 A munici-
pality can only be liable for a § 1983 claim if one of its policies or customs 
caused the harm.50 The Court refused to apply vicarious liability, stating that 
municipalities will not be held liable under § 1983 for a wrong done exclusive-
ly by one of its personnel.51 Nonetheless, the Court’s decision in Monell 
opened access to federal courts for all citizens to bring § 1983 claims against 
both law enforcement officers and municipalities.52 
B. The Creation of Qualified Immunity 
The United States Supreme Court has regularly granted government offi-
cials some type of immunity from lawsuits to defend them from unnecessary 
obstructions in their job duties and from “potentially disabling threats of liabil-
ity.”53 This immunity typically comes in the form of qualified immunity, which 
is defined as “[i]mmunity from civil liability for a public official who is per-
forming a discretionary function, as long as the conduct does not violate clear-
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 683, 690. The Court in Monroe reasoned that the forty-second Con-
gress did not intend municipal corporations to be included as a “person” in the Act, and therefore held 
that the City of Chicago was not liable for any 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187, 
191, 204. Nonetheless, that portion of the Monroe decision was later overturned in Monell. See Mo-
nell, 436 U.S. at 665, 690. The Court in Monroe refrained from discussing policy questions and con-
siderations around municipal liability in § 1983 claims. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191. 
 49 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. In Monell, female employees at the Department of Social Services 
and the Board of Education of the City of New York brought a § 1983 claim alleging that the Depart-
ment enforced an official policy of involuntary unpaid maternity leave after five months of pregnancy. 
Id. at 660–61. 
 50 Id. at 690–91. 
 51 See id. at 691. 
 52 Id. at 694–95. The Eleventh Amendment creates an immunity that bar suits in federal court 
against a nonconsenting state or one of its departments. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see Alabama v. 
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits a suit against a non-
consenting state and its board of corrections). 
 53 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (discussing immunity precedents against 
executive officials). The Supreme Court has granted absolute immunity to some government officials 
because their “special functions or constitutional status” necessitate a total defense from liability. Id. 
at 807; see, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363–64 (1978) (showing that judges, in their 
official capacity, are entitled to absolute immunity); Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 
491, 501–03 (1975) (showing that legislators, in their official capacity, are entitled to absolute immun-
ity). Absolute immunity shields certain officials even when their actions violate clearly established 
law, whereas qualified immunity is more limited in application and only applies if the official did not 
violate clearly established law. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (holding that government officials are 
afforded qualified immunity if their actions do not violate “clearly established clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known”); Pierson v. Ray, 
386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (discussing absolute immunity afforded to judges). 
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ly established constitutional or statutory rights.”54The origin of qualified im-
munity lies with the Court’s 1967 holding in Pierson v. Ray.55 In Pierson, the 
Court shielded police officers from liability when they made a false arrest be-
cause they acted in good faith and with probable cause.56 Since Pierson, the 
Supreme Court expanded the qualified immunity doctrine with subsequent de-
cisions in 1975, 1982, and 1987, all affording government officials more pro-
tections.57 
In 1975, in Wood v. Strickland, the Court created a two-part test to deter-
mine qualified immunity for public officials, which included both an objective 
reasonableness factor and a subjective factor that took an official’s malice into 
account.58 In 1982 though, the Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald eliminated the 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Immunity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Qualified immunity is a judicial doc-
trine that protects government officials from civil liability when their alleged conduct does not violate 
“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Qualified immunity is founded on the principle that officers should 
not be liable for their unconstitutional acts unless they were provided fair notice that their actions were 
unlawful at the time of the incident. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004). Qualified 
immunity is aimed at balancing the related interests of holding public officials responsible when they 
abuse their authority, and protecting public officials from harassment and interference with work 
duties and liability when they act reasonably in their official capacity. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 
(discussing the intended aims of qualified immunity). Irrespective of an official’s mistake being one 
of law, fact, or a combination of the two, the protections of qualified immunity apply. Groh v. 
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004); Butz, 438 U.S. at 507. Qualified immunity is not simply a defense 
to liability, but immunity from a suit in its entirety. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). 
 55 See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557; see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982) (holding 
that the “President of the United States, is entitled to absolute immunity”); Butz v. Economou, 438 
U.S. 478, 515–17 (1978) (holding that prosecutors and other executive officials engaged in adjudica-
tive functions are entitled to absolute immunity); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (rea-
soning that because executive officials have greater responsibilities and duties than other government 
officials, their protections should be greater and more comprehensive). Pierson involved a racially 
mixed group of church ministers that attempted to use segregated facilities at a bus terminal in Jack-
son, Mississippi, in 1961. 386 U.S. at 548–49. The ministers were arrested by the police, charged, and 
sentenced to a maximum sentence of four months in prison and a two-hundred dollar fine. Id. at 548–
50. 
 56 386 U.S. at 547–57. In Pierson, the ministers claimed that the police arrested them solely for 
trying to use the “White Only” waiting room since “no crowd was present,” and “no one threatened 
violence or seemed [likely] to cause a disturbance.” Id. at 557. The officers contended that they did 
not arrest the ministers to preserve segregation in the South, but instead were trying to prevent vio-
lence. Id. The Supreme Court said the jury, though ruling in favor of the officers, had been “influ-
enced by irrelevant and prejudicial evidence” and thus the Court remanded the case to the trial court 
for a new trial. Id. at 557–58. The Court in Monroe said that § 1983 should be “read against the back-
drop of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” 365 
U.S. at 187. Subsequently, the Court in Pierson said the backdrop referenced in Monroe includes the 
defense of good faith and probable cause for police officers. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 556–57. 
 57 See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (concerning a warrantless search of a 
home by FBI agents and other law enforcement officials); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 800 (concerning an 
alleged unlawful discharge from the Air Force); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (con-
cerning school officials expelling of students). 
 58 Wood, 420 U.S. at 321–22. Although Wood involved school officials, the Court held those 
officials could be held liable if they “knew or reasonably should have known” that they would violate 
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subjective element.59 After Harlow, the Court continued granting government 
officials qualified immunity, dismissing citizen’s civil rights claims.60 Due to a 
lack of specificity and summary judgment decisions that did not allow plain-
tiffs the ability to reach the discovery stage of trial, problems alleging § 1983 
claims quickly arose after Harlow.61 
In 1987, in Anderson v. Creighton, the Supreme Court held that a Federal 
Bureau of Investigation agent’s search of an individual’s home without a war-
rant was constitutional because the agent suspected a fleeing robbery felon was 
in the home.62 Fearing an abandonment of the objective reasonableness test, 
the Court noted that violated rights need to be clearly established in a “more 
particularized, and hence more relevant sense.”63 The Court’s aim was to find 
the middle ground between downright eliminating qualified immunity when 
malice is alleged, and allowing qualified immunity to shun all § 1983 claims.64 
Following these seminal decisions, the issue of qualified immunity for of-
ficers so deeply divided federal circuit courts that the Supreme Court revisited 
the topic with its 2001 decision in Saucier v. Katz.65 In Saucier, a man brought 
                                                                                                                           
a student’s constitutional rights or if the school official deliberately meant to deny the student such a 
right. Id. at 322. The two-part test was intended to balance the legitimate needs of a responsible public 
official with that of an individual’s civil rights. Id. at 321. 
 59 457 U.S. at 815–18. 
 60 See id. at 817–18; Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 
100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62, 63 (2016), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/02/Kinports_PDF1.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV38-F69P] (discussing a recent decade-and-
a-half-long trend of Supreme Court decisions that grant qualified immunity to government defendants 
over § 1983 claimants). The Court has not favored a plaintiff in a § 1983 qualified immunity case 
since 2004. See Kinports, supra, at 63 n.7; see also Groh, 540 U.S. at 565 (showing the last time the 
Court has favored a § 1983 plaintiff). 
 61 See Denson, supra note 23, at 756 (stating that “to achieve the socially desirable goal of deter-
ring future violations by providing guidance to public officials, while at the same time not holding 
officials liable for violating constitutional rights in novel situations, constitutional rights must be rec-
ognizable in a more useful sense”). 
 62 483 U.S. 635, 637. The fleeing felon was not found in the home. Id. 
 63 See id. at 640 (saying the right must be sufficiently stated so a “reasonable official would un-
derstand that what he is doing violates that right”). The Court said that to hold police officers liable, 
their actions do not need to be exact replicas of previous cases, but that under current law at the time 
of the incident, the unlawfulness of the action needs to be apparent. Id.; see Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 534–
35 n.12 (stating officials aren’t immune to suit just because an action hasn’t occurred under the exact 
same circumstance, but that when legitimate instances requiring an exception exist, those exceptions 
do not violate clearly established law); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1986) (“On-
ly where the warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in 
its existence unreasonable, will the shield of immunity be lost.”). 
 64 See Denson, supra note 23, at 757 (arguing that the Court failed at striking this balance due to 
the Court’s bewildering explanation that an officer can act reasonably unreasonable and be granted 
qualified immunity). 
 65 533 U.S. 194  (2001); see Tahir Duckett, Note, Unreasonably Immune: Rethinking Qualified 
Immunity in Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Cases, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 419 n.93 (2016) 
(comparing circuit cases on qualified immunity); see also Katz v. United States, 194 F.3d 962, 968 
(9th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that qualified immunity and excessive force require the same analyses); 
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a Bivens action against military officers alleging Fourth Amendment violations 
for use of excessive force to arrest him.66 The Court stated that the inquiries 
into excessive force and qualified immunity were distinct from one another, 
with the latter acknowledging that officers can make reasonable mistakes about 
the legality of their conduct.67 The Court then set out a sequential two-step test 
to decide qualified immunity claims for officers.68 First, a court must decide if 
a constitutional right was infringed upon by the most favorable interpretation 
of the facts to the plaintiff.69 Then, supposing such an infringement occurred, a 
court must determine if that right was “clearly established” law.70 Deciding if 
the facts alleged demonstrate if the officer’s acts violated a constitutional right 
was thus mandated as the threshold inquiry in all qualified immunity cases.71 
Eight years later, however, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Supreme Court rolled 
back the strict sequential order stating that although Saucier’s procedures were 
sometimes appropriate, it should not be mandatory in all instances.72 The Su-
preme Court continued to build upon its newly forged doctrine of qualified 
immunity by adding another component to the analysis of police use of force 
through prominent decisions in the late 1980s.73 
C. Police Use of Excessive Force 
Excessive force is “[u]nreasonable or unnecessary force under the cir-
cumstances.”74 The first time the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionali-
                                                                                                                           
Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1051 (6th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that qualified immunity and exces-
sive force require the same analyses); Snyder v. Trepangnie, 142 F.3d 791, 800 (5th. Cir. 1998) (stat-
ing there is not conflict between finding qualified immunity and finding excessive force). 
 66 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 198–99; see supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text (explaining the 
difference between a Bivens claim and a § 1983 claim). In Saucier, the plaintiff was an injured sixty-
year-old with a leg brace, who was forcibly removed from an Al Gore event after trying to protest 
with a sign that read “Please Keep Animal Torture Out of Our National Parks.” See 533 U.S. at 197–
98; see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.30 (noting qualified immunity of state officials sued under 
§ 1983 is commensurate with the immunity of federal officers sued directly under the Constitution). 
 67 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204–05. 
 68 Id. at 201. 
 69 Id. at 200. 
 70 Id. The Court noted the inquiry into qualified immunity must consider the specific context of 
the situation, but did not mention the subjective mind of the officer. Id. at 202. 
 71 Id. at 201. 
 72 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 242 (claiming Saucier’s procedures unnecessarily expanded 
litigation resources, increased the potential for confusion and bad decisions, and resulted in too much 
inflexibility). See id. at 237–42. 
 73 See generally Graham v. Connor (Graham III), 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (holding that the 
objective reasonableness standard should be used for Fourth Amendment claims), rev’g Graham v. 
City of Charlotte (Graham II), 827 F.2d 945, 946 (4th Cir. 1987), aff’g Graham v. City of Charlotte 
(Graham I), 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1986); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (cre-
ating the objective reasonableness test for Fourth Amendment seizures). 
 74 Excessive Force, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Reasonable force is defined as 
“[f]orce that is not excessive and that is appropriate for protecting oneself or one’s property. The use 
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ty of police use of excessive force was in its 1985 decision in Tennessee v. 
Garner.75 In Garner, the Court held a Tennessee statute unconstitutional be-
cause it granted police the right to use any and all necessary means to complete 
an arrest.76 The Court created a reasonableness test to analyze the police of-
ficer’s use of force, which balances the governmental interest in effecting law 
enforcement with the individual interest of freedom from unreasonable search 
and seizure.77 The Court reasoned that the government’s interest in fatally 
shooting a nondangerous fleeing suspect is heavily outweighed by an individu-
al’s interest in their own life.78 The Court did note that although this instance 
was determined to be an unconstitutional use of police force, if the suspect 
threatened the officer with a weapon or if there was probable cause that the 
suspect “committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of 
serious physical harm,” deadly force preventing the suspect from fleeing could 
be constitutional.79 
After the Court’s decision in Garner, it revisited the issue of excessive 
force under the Fourth Amendment with its decision in Graham v. Connor in 
1989.80 Graham III involved a police officer’s use of force that did not culmi-
nate in an arrest, but did subsequently injure the suspect.81 The injured citizen, 
                                                                                                                           
of reasonable force will not render a person criminally or tortuously liable.” Reasonable Force, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Generally, whether a police officer used excessive force 
in a given situation is a factual determination for the trier of fact. Legal Info. Inst., Excessive Force, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/excessive_force [https://perma.cc/64PM-G45G]. Although police 
use of force is allowed in certain circumstances, like self-defense or defense of another individual, 
there is no universal set of rules that govern when an officer should use force, and if so, to what 
amount. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, Police Use of Force, https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-
enforcement/officer-safety/use-of-force/pages/welcome.aspx#noteReferrer2 [https://perma.cc/2T5X-
TM8V] (describing various aspects of use of force with police officers). 
 75 471 U.S. 1 (1985); see Stacey Barchenger, How a Tennessee Case Forever Changed Police 
Shootings, THE TENNESSEAN (Aug. 23, 2015), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2015/08/21/
how-tennessee-case-forever-changed-police-shootings/31848333/ [https://perma.cc/77FC-VN2T]. 
 76 Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. Garner involved a nighttime burglary that resulted in an African 
American teenage boy, Edward Garner, being fatally shot in the back of the head by a Memphis Po-
lice Officer. See id. at 3–4. Although the officer admitted to seeing no sign of a weapon, clearly saw 
the suspects face and hands, and was “reasonably sure” that the suspect was unarmed and nonthreaten-
ing in size, the officer nonetheless shot him in the back of the head to prevent his escape. Id. Only ten 
dollars and a purse were found on Garner’s deceased body. Id. at 4. 
 77 Id. at 8–9. 
 78 See id. at 11. 
 79 Id. at 11–12. 
 80 Graham III, 490 U.S. at 386. 
 81 Id. at 388–89. Graham III involved a diabetic man, Dethorne Graham, who was facing the 
beginning of insulin shock. Id. at 388. Mr. Graham asked a friend to drive him to a nearby conven-
ience store so he could buy orange juice to stop the approaching reaction, but after seeing a long line 
ahead of him, he put the juice down, hurried out of the convenience store, and asked to be taken to a 
nearby friend’s house instead. Id. at 388–89. A police officer saw Mr. Graham enter the store and 
leave in a hurry, became suspicious, and made an investigatory stop about half a mile from the con-
venience store. Id. at 389. Despite the men’s explanation of Mr. Graham’s diabetic condition and 
ensuing reaction, the officer made them wait while he found out what happened at the convenience 
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Dethorne Graham, filed a § 1983 suit in federal court against the officers in-
volved, claiming they violated the Fourteenth Amendment by using excessive 
force in their investigatory stop.82 The United States District Court for the 
Western District of North Carolina granted a motion for a directed verdict in 
favor of the officers, using a four-factor test to ultimately determine the offic-
ers did not use excessive force.83 The court held the amount of force used was 
“appropriate under the circumstances,” because “there was no discernable inju-
ry inflicted,” and the force used “was not applied maliciously or sadistically 
for the very purpose of causing harm,” but in “a good faith effort to maintain 
or restore order in the face of a potentially explosive situation.”84 On appeal, a 
divided United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court’s decision, endorsing the four-factor test and agreeing that the offic-
ers’ use of force was not excessive.85 The United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and reversed the decisions of the lower courts, reasoning that exces-
sive force claims arising from investigatory stops are properly analyzed under 
the Fourth Amendment's “objective reasonableness” standard, rather than the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process standard.86 This decision did 
                                                                                                                           
store. Id. Next the officer returned to his car to call for backup, Mr. Graham began entering diabetic 
shock, got out of the car, ran around it twice, and then passed out on the curb after collapsing. Id. 
More police officers soon arrived in response to the initial officer’s call for backup, then one officer 
turned Mr. Graham over on his stomach and tightly cuffed him behind his back, ignoring the friend’s 
requests to get Mr. Graham orange juice. Id. Another officer said, “Ain’t nothing wrong with the M.F. 
but drunk. Lock the S.B. up.” Id. Several officers then picked Mr. Graham from his back, carried him 
to his friend’s car, and forced his face down on the hood. Id. Mr. Graham started to regain conscious-
ness and asked the officers to check his wallet for a diabetic decal that he carried, but the officers told 
him to “shut up” and thrust his face back onto the hood of the car. Id. Four officers then grabbed Gra-
ham by each of his limbs and threw him head first into the back of a police car. Id. The officers then 
would not allow the friend to bring Mr. Graham some orange juice. Id. Shortly thereafter, the officers 
were informed that Mr. Graham did nothing illegal at the convenience store, so they drove him home 
and released him. Id. During their investigatory stop, though, Mr. Graham sustained a broken foot, 
lacerations on his wrists, a bruised forehead, an injured shoulder, and developed a loud ringing in his 
ear. Id. at 390. 
 82 Id. at 390. 
 83 Id. at 390–91. The four factors the district court used were: “(1) The need for the application 
for the force. (2) The relationship between the need and the amount of the force that was used. (3) The 
extent of the injury inflicted. (4) Whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and 
restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Graham I, 
644 F. Supp. at 248. 
 84 Graham I, 644 F. Supp. at 248–49. 
 85 Graham II, 827 F.2d at 946. The court reasoned that the four-factor test was available for all 
excessive force claims sought against government agents. Id. at 948; see Graham III, 490 U.S. at 391. 
The dissenting judge argued that Supreme Court precedent required excessive force claims resulting 
from investigatory stops to be analyzed under the “objective reasonableness” standard set forth in the 
Fourth Amendment. Graham II, 827 F.3d at 950–52 (Butzner, J., dissenting). 
 86 Graham III, 490 U.S. at 392, 394. 
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not end the matter, however, because the Court revisited the issue again eight-
een years later.87 
The Supreme Court took up the question of what constitutes excessive 
force under the Fourth Amendment again in 2007 with Scott v. Harris.88 In 
Scott, a deputy sheriff pursued a car that was traveling on a highway at speeds 
nearly twenty miles per hour over the speed limit.89 After a high-speed chase 
developed, another officer joined the pursuit without knowing the underlying 
nature of the offense and rammed the suspect’s vehicle, causing the suspect to 
lose control and sustain severe injuries.90 The driver, Victor Harris, sued the 
officers under § 1983, claiming the officers abused Harris’s Fourth Amend-
ment protection against unreasonable seizure.91 After the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia ruled in favor of the driver and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, the Supreme 
Court reversed the decision in an eight Justice majority.92 In ruling in favor of 
the police, the Court stated that Harris’s reckless actions placed officers, other 
drivers, and pedestrians at risk of serious injury or death.93 The Court reasoned 
this risk was enough to determine the officer’s actions were reasonable and not 
excessive.94 Scott was the latest in a long line of foundational cases concerning 
the doctrines of qualified immunity and excessive force, which are still being 
developed by the Court.95 
II. THE DOCTRINES OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY & EXCESSIVE FORCE:  
A DISCUSSION OF CURRENT TESTS & STANDARDS 
Although recent § 1983 claims have provided the Supreme Court an op-
portunity to change the direction in which qualified immunity and excessive 
force jurisprudence is headed, the Court largely continues to build upon past 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374–76 (2007) (involving a high-speed car chase where 
police officers bumped the fleeing car, critically injuring the driver). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 374. 
 90 Id. at 374–75. 
 91 Id. at 375–76. 
 92 Id. at 376, 379–80. 
 93 Id. The video evidence of the police pursuit introduced to the Supreme Court, which was not 
used in trial before either the district court or court of appeals, was found to contradict the account of 
events told by Harris and the court of appeals. Id. at 378. The Court supported its position by giving 
the public access to the video, stating, “[w]e are happy to allow the videotape to speak for itself.” See 
id. at 378 n.5; see also Record at 36, Exh. A, Scott, 550 U.S. 372 (No. 05-1631), https://www.supreme
court.gov/media/video/mp4files/scott_v_harris.mp4 [https://perma.cc/6W98-P3PE] (showing the 
referred incident through one of the police officer’s dashcam video). 
 94 Scott, 550 U.S. at 386. The Court reasoned that the government’s interest in protecting officers, 
innocent drivers, and pedestrians heavily outweighed the risk of injury to a reckless driver by ram-
ming their car. Id. at 384. 
 95 See generally Scott, 550 U.S. 372; Graham III, 490 U.S. 386; Garner, 471 U.S. 1. 
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precedents by increasing protections for police officers.96 In the most recent 
cases regarding § 1983 claims, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the de-
fendant police officers.97 The first of those cases set the stage for continued 
litigation surrounding the tests for reasonableness and clearly established 
law.98 Section A of this Part discusses qualified immunity and the development 
of “clearly established law” in a recent Supreme Court decision.99 Section B 
discusses the legitimate interests of qualified immunity for police and govern-
ment actors.100 Section C discusses the standards the Court created for exces-
sive force and how it recently changed.101 
A. Clearly Established Means Unconditionally  
Immune in Mullenix v. Luna 
In 2015, in Mullenix v. Luna, the United States Supreme Court set the 
stage for continued litigation over qualified immunity and what is “clearly es-
tablished” law.102 In Mullenix IV, the estate of a deceased motorist brought a 
§ 1983 claim against a state trooper for using excessive force to shoot and kill 
the fleeing motorist suspect during a high-speed pursuit.103 After presentation 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See Kinports, supra note 60, at 64 (explaining the Court has expanded qualified immunity 
doctrine by continuously adding elements); Marshall Heins II, Note, Absolutely Qualified: Supreme 
Court Transforms the Doctrine of Qualified Immunity into Absolute Immunity for Police Officers, 8 
HOUS. L. REV.: OFF THE REC. 1, 2 (2017), https://houstonlawreview.org/article/4445 [https://perma.
cc/A2GW-W2X8] (stating the Court decided to ignore victims and afford police officers strengthened 
protections that essentially amount to “absolute immunity”). Absolute immunity is defined as “[a] 
complete exemption from civil liability, usually afforded to officials while performing particularly 
important functions, such as a representative enacting legislation and a judge presiding over a law-
suit.” Absolute Immunity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 97 See, e.g., Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1150 (2018) (reversing the lower court’s decision 
and ruling in favor of the defendant police officer); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (reversing 
the lower courts denial of qualified immunity for defendant police officers); Mullenix v. Luna (Mul-
lenix IV), 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (reversing the lower court decision and ruling in favor of the 
defendant police officer, granting him qualified immunity). 
 98 See Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 308. 
 99 See infra notes 102–132 and accompanying text. 
 100 See infra notes 133–150 and accompanying text. 
 101 See infra notes 151–160 and accompanying text. 
 102 See Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 308. 
 103 Id. at 307. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas denied Defend-
ant Officer Mullenix’s, motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, then Mullenix 
appealed. Id.; see also Luna v. Mullenix (Mullenix I), No. 2:12-CV-152-J, 2013 WL 4017124, at *6 
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2013). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. 
at 307; see also Luna v. Mullenix (Mullenix II), 765 F.3d 531, 533 (5th Cir. 2014). Mullenix then 
sought a rehearing en banc, but the Fifth Circuit denied his petition. See Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 
308. The two judges who formed the panel’s majority withdrew their original opinion and substituted 
a new one, which recognized that objective reasonableness is a question of law that can be decided at 
summary judgment, as the dissenting judge pointed out. Id.; see also Luna v. Mullenix (Mullenix III), 
773 F.3d 712, 715 (5th Cir. 2014). Nonetheless, the court reaffirmed the denial of qualified immunity 
for officer Mullenix. Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 308; see also Mullenix III, 773 F.3d at 715. Officer 
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of a warrant for his arrest, the deceased motorist, Israel Leija Jr., sped away 
from an officer and entered an interstate highway in an effort to escape.104 Mr. 
Leija led police on a high-speed chase at over one hundred miles per hour and 
called the police dispatcher threatening to shoot at police officers who did not 
stop their pursuit.105 The dispatcher relayed the threats levied by Mr. Leija to 
police involved with the pursuit, and reported that Mr. Leija may have been 
drunk.106 During the pursuit, other officers set up tire spikes on routes that Mr. 
Leija was expected to reach.107 Officer Chadrin Mullenix arrived late to the 
area where the spike strips were deployed, but decided to formulate another 
tactic to single-handedly stop the chase.108 Officer Mullenix sought to disable 
Mr. Leija’s car by shooting it before it reached the tire spikes.109 Officer Mul-
lenix relayed his plan to his supervisor, who told Mullenix to “stand by” and 
wait to “see if the spikes work first.”110 While waiting for Mr. Leija’s vehicle 
to appear, Officer Mullenix discussed his plan with a nearby officer who in-
formed Mullenix that another officer was beneath the overpass.111 Upon spot-
ting Mr. Leija’s vehicle, Officer Mullenix fired six shots at the vehicle, later 
admitting that it was difficult to see under the overpass at night, especially 
without any streetlights.112 Mr. Leija’s car continued forward and engaged the 
tire spikes, hit the median, then rolled over multiple times.113 It was deter-
mined later that Mr. Leija was killed by Officer Mullenix’s shots, potentially 
before he even made contact with the tire spikes.114 Following the incident, 
                                                                                                                           
Mullenix petitioned for a writ of certiorari, and the United States Supreme Court granted the petition, 
ultimately reversing the Fifth Circuit’s decision. Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 308. 
 104 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 306. The warrant was for failing to complete community service 
hours while on probation, and a new domestic violence complaint. See Mullenix III, 773 F.3d at 716. 
 105 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 306. The chase occurred at night on a highway with light traffic, no 
pedestrians, and no stopped vehicles. Mullenix III, 773 F.3d at 716. The cross traffic was divided by a 
large center median, and Mr. Leija did not hit another vehicle or cause another vehicle to crash. Id. 
 106 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 306. Despite the threats from Mr. Leija, there was no weapon in the 
car. Mullenix III, 773 F.3d at 716. 
 107 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 306. The officers involved received training on how to properly 
deploy spike strips and how to take a defensive position that minimized any risks posed by the drivers. 
Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. Mullenix received no training on shooting to disable cars, and had never attempted such an 
act before. Id. 
 110 Id. at 306–07. Mullenix claims not to have heard his supervisor’s commands over the radio 
because he had already exited his vehicle with his rifle and positioned himself to shoot. Mullenix III, 
773 F.3d at 717. 
 111 Mullenix III, 773 F.3d at 717. Mullenix acknowledged the risk of harming another officer, but 
stated that he did not think he would hit the officer beneath the overpass. Id. 
 112 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 307; Mullenix III, 773 F.3d at 717. Mullenix also admitted that he 
could not discern how many people were in the vehicle, whether there were passengers, or what any-
one was doing inside the vehicle. Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 307. 
 113 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 307. 
 114 Id. Four shots struck Mr. Leija in his upper body, but no shots hit the vehicle’s engine block, 
radiator, or even the hood. Id. 
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Officer Mullenix boasted to his supervisor saying, “[h]ow’s that for proac-
tive?”115 
The Court only addressed the question of qualified immunity, and left un-
answered the question of whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation.116 
Noting that a “clearly established right” must be so clear that “every reasona-
ble official would have known” they were violating that right, the Court held 
that you cannot define the clearly established right at a high level of generali-
ty.117 The Court went on to reason that existing precedent must place the ques-
tion “beyond debate.”118 The relevant inquiry here for the Court was whether 
Officer Mullenix acted unreasonably “beyond debate.”119 In an attempt to 
show the “hazy legal backdrop against which [officer] Mullenix acted” the 
Court compared the facts in Mullenix IV to the facts in Brosseau v. Haugen.120 
The Court stated that the threat Mr. Leija posed to officers was comparable to 
the threat posed to officers in Brosseau by a fleeing suspect headed in the gen-
eral area of other officers and onlookers.121 The Court detailed some helpful 
facts from Mullenix IV to justify its earlier position and reasoning in 
Brosseau.122 Ultimately, the majority in Mullenix IV held that no precedent 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Mullenix III, 773 F.3d at 717. This was the same supervisor who told Mullenix to “stand by” 
and wait to “see if the spikes work first.” Id. During a counseling session earlier that same day, officer 
Mullenix’s supervisor told by him that he was not being proactive enough as a police officer. Id. 
 116 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 308. The facts of Mullenix presented the United States Supreme 
Court with a wide-ranging concoction of police use of force, Fourth Amendment violations, and quali-
fied immunity, which was ultimately another chance to clarify these confusing doctrines. Id. at 306–
08. The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in the case. Id. at 308. 
 117 Id. (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)); Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 
731, 741 (2011). 
 118 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741–42). The Court does not 
demand a case that is directly on point, but the particular facts of past cases are nonetheless relevant to 
the Court’s analysis. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741. 
 119 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 309. The Court in Mullenix IV points to the Brosseau v. Haugen 
case, saying it was almost an exact illustration for qualified immunity in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment. Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 309–10; see Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) 
(stating the correct inquiry was whether it was clearly established in a “more ‘particularized’ sense” 
that the officer’s actions were prohibited by the Fourth Amendment in the context they confronted). 
The Court in Mullenix IV also looks to Anderson v. Creighton, to show that when an analysis does not 
address the specific circumstances with which the specific officer was confronted, it falls short of the 
required specificity. Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 309; see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640–41 
(1987) (stating a conclusion that an officer’s search was objectively unreasonable did not follow im-
mediately from, and thus was not clearly established by, the principle of warrantless searches in the 
Fourth Amendment context). 
 120 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct at 309–10. Brosseau involved an officer who shot a fleeing suspect out 
of fear that the suspect would endanger other nearby officers on foot, other motorists on the road, and 
any other citizen who may be in the area. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 196–97. The fleeing suspect was shot 
in close proximity “shortly after [the car] began to move.” Id. 
 121 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 310. 
 122 See id. (reasoning that by time officer Mullenix fired his rifle, Mr. Leija led police on a twen-
ty-five-mile chase reaching speeds of over one hundred miles per hour, was purportedly drunk, al-
ready threatened to shoot officers on two occasions, and was speeding towards officers). Notably, the 
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squarely governed the facts that officer Mullenix faced, and thus could not 
conclude that he acted unreasonably “beyond debate.”123 
As the lone dissenter in Mullenix IV, Justice Sotomayor believed it was 
clearly established under the Fourth Amendment that an officer in Mullenix’s 
position should not have fired his rifle, and that officer Mullenix’s “rogue con-
duct” killed Mr. Leija.124 Justice Sotomayor stated that the Fourth Amendment 
is violated unless the governmental interests in carrying out a specific seizure 
outweighs the infringement on the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights.125 
Inherent in that analysis is the fact that the government must have a legitimate 
interest in using deadly force over other kinds of force.126 Thus, the proper fo-
cus in answering the “clearly established” legal question is whether, knowing 
what Officer Mullenix knew at the time, there was a governmental interest in 
shooting at the car rather than waiting for the tire spikes.127 Justice Sotomayor 
thought it was important to note that Mr. Leija was going to, and indeed did, 
cross the tire spikes even though officer Mullenix claimed concern for his fel-
low officers below who set the tire spikes.128 Although the majority suggests 
                                                                                                                           
Court did not consider that officer Mullenix, unlike the officer in Brosseau, used improvisational 
deadly tactics for which he had no training, disobeyed orders from a supervisor, fired six rifle shots 
from a far distance into a car that admittedly was hard to see at night in the absence of ambient light-
ing, without knowing who or what was in the car, and disregarded the tire spikes already in place that 
would likely have been successful. See Mullenix III, 773 F.3d at 717. 
 123 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 310–12. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia went a step further, stat-
ing that the proper focus should have been on whether it was reasonable to shoot at the car’s engine in 
light of the risk to the suspect. Id. at 313 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia believed the majority 
unfairly portrayed Officer Mullenix’s actions, and that although Mullenix used deadly force, he did 
not intend to harm Mr. Leija. Id. at 312–13. 
 124 Id. at 313 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). An officer’s actual intentions are irrelevant to the Fourth 
Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard. See Graham v. Connor (Graham III), 490 U.S. 386, 
397 (1989) (stating that the objective reasonableness inquiry takes the circumstances facing the officer 
into account and disregards the officer’s underlying motivations). 
 125 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 314 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see Scott, 550 U.S. at 383. There 
must be a “governmental interes[t]” in both effectuating a seizure and “how [the seizure] is carried 
out.” Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 314 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 
U.S. 1, 8 (1985)); see id. at 316 (stating that the majority ignored clearly established Fourth Amend-
ment precedent that requires both a governmental interest in seizing a suspect as well as in the level of 
force used to seize that suspect). 
 126 See Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 314 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 127 Id. The majority, according to Justice Sotomayor, did not prove any such governmental inter-
est, but claimed that Officer Mullenix planned to stop the car “in a manner that avoided the risks” of 
relying on tire spikes. See id. at 311 (majority opinion). Yet, there was no evidence in the record to 
even remotely suggest that shooting a vehicle in the manner contemplated by Officer Mullenix could 
stop the vehicle before engaging the tire spikes, or in a more effective manner than using the tire 
spikes alone. Id. at 314–15 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 128 Id. at 314 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). “Even if his shots hit Leija’s engine block, the car 
would not have stopped instantly” and regardless, the officers were “trained to take defensive posi-
tions” when utilizing tire spikes. Id. The threats posed by Leija’s speeding vehicle existed irrespective 
of whether the car was stopped by shooting the engine block, hitting the tire spikes, or a combination 
of the two. Id. 
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that tire spikes are fallible, two additional tire spikes were placed further along 
down the interstate in case the first set of spikes failed.129 This led Justice So-
tomayor to conclude that no reasonable officer could have believed that shoot-
ing at a speeding vehicle would stop the vehicle with less jeopardy or better 
conviction than waiting for the it to come into contact with tire spikes.130 Ac-
cording to Justice Sotomayor, since it is clearly established that a governmen-
tal interest must necessitate deadly force, even if it is not always clearly estab-
lished what specific level of governmental interest is sufficient, Officer Mul-
lenix violated Mr. Leija’s right to be free of intrusion.131 Accordingly, Justice 
Sotomayor saw no reason overturn the Fifth Circuit’s decision.132 
B. Policy and Qualified Immunity Interests for Police Officers 
The Supreme Court has essentially reversed almost all lower court cases 
where the court denied qualified immunity for police officers, stressing the 
importance of qualified immunity to all of society133 Qualified immunity as a 
doctrine has been defended as a necessity to ensure that suitable officials are 
not dissuaded from public service due to fear of potential lawsuits.134 Support-
ing this policy, the Court stated that a lawsuit could be a heavy burden for a 
public servant, and accordingly aims to dismiss frivolous lawsuits against offi-
                                                                                                                           
 129 See id. at 306, 310–11 (majority opinion) (suggesting that Officer Mullenix’s fears about Leija’s 
vehicle remaining a threat after engaging the tire spikes was valid); see also Mullenix III, 773 F.3d at 716 
(“[P]olice units set up . . . a total of three spike locations ahead of the pursuit.”). 
 130 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 315 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor also noted that 
Officer Mullenix’s decision to shoot at the vehicle was even more unreasonable since he had three 
minutes to deliberate taking any action before Mr. Leija even came into his sights—something the 
majority did not address. See id. at 316; Mullenix III, 773 F.3d at 716. 
 131 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Focusing solely on the majority’s 
version of the facts, there is still no governmental interest that justifies shooting the car before it hit 
the tire spikes. See Heins II, supra note 96, at 8 (explaining Justice Sotomayor’s reasoning in her 
dissent). 
 132 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 133 See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 82 (2018) 
(showing that out of over thirty decided cases on qualified immunity since 1982, the Supreme Court 
has found a violation of clearly established law only twice); see, e.g., White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 
551 (2017) (stating that qualified immunity is “important to society as a whole”); City & Cty. of San 
Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (stating that the Supreme Court often reverses 
lower court decisions because of how “important to society as a whole” qualified immunity is). The 
Court’s recent decisions in District of Columbia v. Wesby, and Kisela v. Hughes, bring the total quali-
fied immunity decisions to thirty-two. See Kisela, 138 S. Ct. at 1150 (involving a woman who was 
shot by a police officer after they received a 911 call about a woman acting erratically with a knife); 
District of Columbia v. Websy, 138 S. Ct. 577, 582 (2018) (involving excessive force by police when 
they entered an abandon building and arrested partygoers inside). 
 134 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319–20 (1975) (claiming that the denial of immunity 
for public officials and the imposition of damages for reasonable mistakes would intimidate and deter 
the most capable of candidates from seeking office); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (stating 
that such an imposition would “contribute not to principled and fearless decision making but to intim-
idation”). 
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cials at the earliest possible stage.135 Yet, very few of these cases are dismissed 
before trial, and even fewer cases are dismissed on qualified immunity 
grounds.136 Additionally, qualified immunity has been used as a safeguard for 
public officials because they are only held accountable for their behavior if 
they are on notice that such behavior is an unconstitutional infringement on an 
individual’s rights.137 
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Saucier v. Katz, the Fourth 
Amendment objective reasonableness standard protected officials who acted 
reasonably in constitutionally murky waters, even if their actions violated the 
Constitution, showing that qualified immunity is gratuitous.138 Yet in 2001, in 
Saucier, the Court proposed a test for when an officer is eligible for qualified 
immunity.139 Since then, the Court has stated inconsistent policy motivations 
for the creation of qualified immunity, not adhering closely to its own prece-
dent.140 Combine these inconsistencies with a steep objective reasonableness 
test, and qualified immunity is essentially giving police officers “two bites at 
the apple.”141 The clearly established law portion of the objective reasonable-
ness test laid out in Harlow is founded in qualified immunity principles, yet 
courts disconcertingly appear to be using the Fourth Amendment to utilize the 
                                                                                                                           
 135 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). The doctrine of qualified immunity is 
intended to allow officials to make informed decisions without the fear of a lawsuit, and thus has 
protected public officials who make reasonable mistakes in good faith. See Wood, 420 U.S. at 319, 
321. 
 136 See Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1797, 1809 (2018) (concluding, after a two-year study of 1,183 § 1983 cases against police officers or 
police departments, that only seven cases were dismissed based upon qualified immunity, while thirty-
eight were dismissed before trial). 
 137 See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 638–39. The Court in Anderson held that officials could not be held 
liable for an infringement on an individual’s rights unless a clearly established right exists. Id. at 641. 
Consequently, when qualified immunity applies to a public official, claims against them do not go to 
trial. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814–15. 
 138 See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: Qualified Immunity in 
Section 1983 Actions for a Police Officer’s Use of Excessive Force, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 97, 99 
(1989) (stating that qualified immunity is superfluous if courts properly interpret Garner when decid-
ing if the force used was objectively unreasonable, because the standards for finding a fourth Amend-
ment violation and deciding immunity are the same). The Garner decision asks if unnecessary force 
was used to effectuate an arrest, and if a reasonable officer in the same position would think that the 
amount of force used was necessary. Id. at 99. 
 139 503 U.S. at 201–02. The court’s chronological test is to first decide if the facts alleged show 
that an officer violated a constitutional right, and if so, decide if that right has been clearly established. 
Id. 
 140 Compare Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009) (holding that the goal of qualified im-
munity is to “free officials from the concerns of . . . ‘avoidance of disruptive discovery’”), and Har-
low, 457 U.S. at 818 (stating that constitutional claims involve intrusive discovery procedures that can 
disrupt the effectiveness of government), with Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231–32 (reasoning that the moti-
vation behind the creation of qualified immunity was to “ensure that ‘insubstantial claims’ against 
government officials [would] be resolved prior to discovery”). 
 141 See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 664 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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test.142 Accordingly, such overlapping standards pose a problem because they 
afford police officers too much protection and further confuse courts about 
when and how to apply each standard.143 
Subsequently, courts have been granting qualified immunity to police if a 
mere possibility exists that the officer did not know they were infringing upon 
a constitutional right.144 The Court in Anderson, however, did not require in the 
moment that officers know they are violating someone’s rights, but rather said 
that the right in contention should be sufficiently clear.145 In 2011, in Ashcroft 
v. al-Kidd, the Supreme Court attempted to further clarify the “clearly estab-
lished” standard by holding that existing precedent must put the question of 
constitutionality “beyond debate.”146 This added element has further limited 
the ability of civilians to bring successful excessive force claims because the 
fact-specific nature of § 1983 cases makes the development of “clearly estab-
lished” law extremely difficult.147 It has been proven that large police depart-
ments and their officers change their actions and behaviors in response to court 
decisions.148 Nevertheless, understanding if someone is an immediate threat or 
not is integral to an officer’s duties.149 Critics argue that analyzing threats are 
so integral to police duties that it is hard to understand why a trained officer 
needs clarity for every potential situation.150 
                                                                                                                           
 142 See Tahir Duckett, Unreasonably Immune: Rethinking Qualified Immunity in Fourth Amend-
ment Excessive Force Cases, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 409, 427 (2016) (discussing how different courts 
are applying inconsistent standards of qualified immunity and Fourth Amendment reasonableness). 
 143 See Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 118, 139–40 (2009) (not-
ing that the rule for reasonableness has become a complete defense for everything but the most hei-
nous behavior); see also Karen M. Blum, Section 1983 Litigation: The Maze, the Mud, and the Mad-
ness, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 913, 945 (2015) (reasoning that the “clearly established” standard 
is “riddled with contradictions and complexities”); Blum et al., supra note 24, at 654–55 (showing the 
increasing difficulty for plaintiffs in proving “clearly established” violations with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claims). 
 144 See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. 
 145 See id. 
 146 Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741; see Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (stating that to 
violate a clearly established law, the law must be “beyond debate”). 
 147 See Michael S. Catlett, Clearly Not Established: Decisional Law and the Qualified Immunity 
Doctrine, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031, 1034–36 (2005) (suggesting that the misunderstanding of the clearly 
established standard arises from the lack of clarity around what sources of common law are proper for 
courts to analyze whether the law is clearly established and how much deviation is allowed). 
 148 See Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 844–
45 (2012) (showing results from a study in which various police departments used data from lawsuits 
to identify problems and improve their practices). 
 149 Id. 
 150 See Graham III, 490 U.S. at 396. Graham was the starting point for over a quarter century of 
developing the concept of imminent threats to police. See id.; Duckett, supra note 142, at 431 (stating 
“it is difficult to imagine the police officers . . . had inadequate direction from the courts”). 
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C. Excessive Force & the Reasonableness Standard Revisited 
In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court advanced an objective reasona-
bleness test based on the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable 
search and seizure to evaluate excessive force during an arrest or an investiga-
tory stop.151 There, the Court relied on Tennessee v. Garner to “make explicit 
what was implicit in Garner’s analysis” and hold that any excessive force 
claims stemming from “an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’” is 
properly scrutinized under a Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard in 
place of a Fourteenth Amendment “substantive due process” standard.152 The 
Court stated that determining reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment 
required one to weigh the violation of someone’s constitutional right with the 
opposing governmental interest.153 The majority in Graham stated that alt-
hough the definition and application of “reasonableness” under the Fourth 
Amendment is not precise, it must be considered from the viewpoint of a “rea-
sonable officer on the scene” instead of considering the “20/20 vision of hind-
sight.”154 The Court further contended that reasonableness calculations should 
allow for an officer’s forced “split-second judgments” about the amount of force 
that is necessary in “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” circumstances.155 
Further still, the Court held that the determination of reasonableness in excessive 
force claims was an objective standard that did not take an officer’s subjective 
mindset and intent into account, irrespective of the presence of malice.156 
Continuing development on the tests for reasonableness in excessive 
force claims, the Supreme Court revisited the topic of excessive force recently 
in 2014 with its decision in Plumhoff v. Rickard.157 Plumhoff involved a high-
speed car chase that ended with both the driver and passenger of the fleeing 
                                                                                                                           
 151 490 U.S. at 395. This decision provided that every § 1983 excessive force claim should not be 
analyzed under the same general standard. Id. at 393; see Baker, 443 U.S. at 144 n.3 (1979) (stating 
§ 1983 provides a way to justify federal rights, but is not a “source of substantive rights” by itself). 
 152 Garner, 471 U.S. at 1; see Graham III, 490 U.S. at 395. Garner involved a claim of deadly 
force used to stop a fleeing suspect who did not appear armed or dangerous. See 471 U.S. at 3–4. The 
complaint alleged Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, but the Court used a Fourth 
Amendment substantive due process standard that determined reasonableness based off how and when 
a particular seizure is carried out. Id. at 7–8. 
 153 Graham III, 490 U.S. at 396. 
 154 Id.; see Garner, 471 U.S. at 7–8. 
 155 Graham III, 490 U.S. at 396–97. 
 156 Id. at 397. An officer’s intent, whether good or bad, is not dispositive of whether a constitu-
tionally permissive amount of force was used. Id. Justice Blackmun wrote the concurrence with Jus-
tice Brennan and Justice Marshall joining, stating there is no reason to hold pre-arrest excessive force 
claims to only a Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard instead of allowing a Four-
teenth Amendment substantive due process standard. Id. at 399–400 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
Whereas substantive due process concerns resulting from a use of force may only appear in rare in-
stances that are not blatantly unreasonable, Justice Blackmun opined that a substantive due process 
analysis should not be applied until such a case arose. See id. at 400. 
 157 See 572 U.S. at 765. 
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vehicle being shot to death by police.158 There, the Court held it was “beyond 
serious dispute” that the fleeing car posed such “grave public safety risk[s]” 
that the officer’s use of “deadly force to end that risk” was reasonable.159 The 
Court further reasoned that if police are justified in using deadly force, then 
they are justified in using that force until the “threat has ended.”160 
III. BETTER APPROACHES TO POLICE USE OF  
FORCE & QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
After decades of common law alterations, the doctrines of excessive force 
and qualified immunity currently betray the original intent of the forty-second 
Congress, and should be revisited to more properly reflect their original pur-
pose of providing justice for otherwise helpless victims of police violence.161 
Section A of this Part argues that the Supreme Court should begin using differ-
ent methods to determine reasonableness.162 Section B discusses the confusing 
and sometimes contradictory directions from the Court in reference to jurors 
and police officers.163 Section C argues that the dangers of being a police of-
ficer have largely been exaggerated.164 Section D suggests a different direction 
the Court can go to improve the doctrine of qualified immunity.165 
                                                                                                                           
 158 See id. at 770. 
 159 Id. at 777. 
 160 Id. The Court briefly mentioned the presence of an innocent passenger, but insisted that their 
presence did not alter the calculations of reasonableness. See id. at 777–78 (stating that Fourth 
Amendment rights cannot be asserted by anyone except the injured person, and the presence of a pas-
senger in a fleeing car does not enhance the rights of the driver). The Court noted further that if the 
passenger would have brought his own claim against the police, the risk he faced would have been a 
central concern, but not all lower courts allow a passenger to recover under the Fourth Amendment. 
See id. at 778 n.4. Compare Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1329 (11th Cir. 2003) (stating that a 
passenger who was shot by police may recover under the Fourth Amendment), and Fisher v. Mem-
phis, 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff may sue under the Fourth Amendment 
because the defendant police officer shot at plaintiff’s vehicle), with Milstead v. Kibler, 243 F.3d 157, 
163–64 (4th Cir. 2001) (suggesting a passenger cannot recover under the Fourth Amendment), and 
Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir. 1990) (suggesting a passenger cannot re-
cover under the Fourth Amendment). The Court also pointed out that it was the driver who put the 
passenger in danger by fleeing, so it would be irrational if the driver’s disregard for safety helped the 
passenger win a claim. Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 778. 
 161 See Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 498 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (suggesting the Court has refused to certain types of immunity in a § 1983 context if it was not 
intended by the forty-second Congress in 1871); Baude, supra note 133, at 55 (suggesting the Court 
has strayed away from congressional intent with its creation of qualified immunity for police officers); 
Richard A. Matasar, Personal Immunities Under Section 1983: The Limits of the Court’s Historical 
Analysis, 40 ARK. L. REV. 741, 774, 794 (1987) (suggesting that the Court misinterpreted congres-
sional intent to hide the justices personal policy agendas). 
 162 See infra notes 166–173 and accompanying text. 
 163 See infra notes 174–189 and accompanying text. 
 164 See infra notes 190–209 and accompanying text. 
 165 See infra notes 210–218 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Court Should Use Hard Data, Science, & Internal  
Policies to Determine Reasonableness 
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that officers need to be 
confident “beyond debate” that their actions violate an individual’s constitu-
tional rights to be held liable for such violations.166 The Court struggles to de-
fine reasonableness, and settles with formulating precedent based on incon-
sistent opinions about reasonable behavior.167 The Court proceeds to weigh 
risks to society against risks to individuals, yet has incongruously claimed it is 
near impossible to quantify such risks.168 As is evident in its holding in 2015, 
in Mullenix v. Luna, the Court nonetheless weighs the reasonableness of an 
officer’s actions without considering hard scientific or statistical data, or inter-
nal police policies.169 Without considering these sources of data, the Court 
nonetheless evaluates police use of force, but spends very little time actually 
evaluating police officers’ use of deadly force.170 
Although police departments across the nation quantify the risks associat-
ed with the use of deadly force and adopt evidence-based policies to guide 
their officers, the Court treats the topic of policing “as more of an art than a 
science.”171 In 1986, in Malley v. Briggs, the Court said that the Harlow stand-
ard sufficiently meets the goals of “avoid[ing] excessive disruption of govern-
ment” and resolving frivolous claims at summary judgment stage, but the 
Court failed to provide any data justifying those purposes and goals.172 The 
Court decided to “slosh . . . through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness’” 
when specialists in better positions to evaluate law enforcement already main-
tain and implement policies that the Court could, and should, adopt.173 
                                                                                                                           
 166 See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014); Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 
741 (2011); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
 167 See John P. Gross, Unguided Missiles: Why the Supreme Court Should Prohibit Police Officers 
from Shooting at Moving Vehicles, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 135, 137, 141 (2016), https://scholarship.
law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1163&context=penn_law_review_online [https://perma.
cc/6BY8-LQV6] (highlighting confusion and inconsistencies in the Court’s approach to reasonable-
ness in the context of excessive force in vehicular pursuits). 
 168 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383–84 (2007). 
 169 See Mullenix v. Luna (Mullenix IV), 136 S. Ct. 305, 310 (2015). 
 170 See id.; Gross, supra note 167, at 142; Seth W. Stoughton, Policing Facts, 88 TUL. L. REV. 
847, 849 (2014). 
 171 See Gross, supra note 167, at 142. 
 172 See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (stating that the goal of the standard laid out 
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982), was to allow the government to work uninterrupt-
ed and remove frivolous or weak claims at summary judgment). Without any data to support justify-
ing the doctrine of qualified immunity, it is hard to imagine how the Court can accurately determine 
the success of qualified immunity. See id. 
 173 Id.; see Gross, supra note 167, at 142; see also Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence 
Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119, 1123 (2008) (showing that instead of using relevant data and 
statistics to evaluate their reasoning, the Court uses of meaningless and ineffective considerations to 
evaluate police actions). 
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B. Reasonableness Confusion Trickles Down to Jurors 
The only constitutional threshold limiting the use of force by police offic-
ers is that their use of force must be reasonable.174 Yet, the Supreme Court’s 
development of decisions regarding excessive force and qualified immunity 
does not properly guide police officers or triers of fact as to what is reasonable 
and under what conditions.175 Rather, as the doctrine of qualified immunity and 
use of force stands today, the Court has offered opposing standards and decid-
ed cases that seemingly conflict with one another.176 In Scott v. Harris, the 
Court even acknowledged that the lack of easy to follow standards means they 
have to persevere without any guidelines concerning what excessive force ac-
tually is, or how to determine reasonableness in most situations.177 The confu-
sion and misdirection applied by the Court has been highlighted in recent deci-
sions like Plumhoff and Mullenix IV.178 Such confusion and misdirection re-
sults in a broader scope of protection for police officer’s than what § 1983 in-
tended, effectively giving police officers greater deference.179 At its current 
point, excessive force analyses favor police and allow for racist biases and 
dangerous stereotypes.180 This proves troublesome because, amongst other 
considerations, implicit bias studies show that violence and criminality are as-
sociated with black people more than any other ethnic or racial group.181 Com-
                                                                                                                           
 174 John P. Gross, Qualified Immunity and the Use of Force: Making the Reckless into the Rea-
sonable, 8 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 67, 67 (2017). 
 175 See Harmon, supra note 173, at 1127 (showing that the Supreme Court has not adequately 
determined or defined what constitutes an inappropriate use of force by police). 
 176 Compare Scott, 550 U.S. 372, 385–86 (declining to hold an officer liable for using deadly 
force on a fleeing suspect), with Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 22 (1985) (holding an officer liable 
for shooting at a fleeing suspect), and Gross, supra note 24, at 181 (stating the Supreme Court con-
demned deadly force against a fleeing suspect in Garner but approved of it in Scott). 
 177 Scott, 550 U.S. at 383; see Gross, supra note 24, at 170 (noting the lack of defined standards 
in Scott); see also Harmon, supra note 173, at 1144 (discussing how the lack of precise framework 
affects police officers and jurors). 
 178 See generally Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 306 (holding that shooting into a car to stop a fleeing 
suspect is a reasonable use of deadly force); Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 777 (reasoning that shooting fifteen 
shots into a fleeing car, killing both the driver and passenger, is reasonable). 
 179 See Gross, supra note 24, at 161; Harmon, supra note 173, at 1123 (acknowledging that the 
Court has encouraged the use of meaningless and ineffective considerations when evaluating an of-
ficer’s actions in court). 
 180 See Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 19, 24–25, Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014) (No. 13-551), 2013 WL 6843336 
(suggesting that the Court’s analysis of reasonableness for police use of force risks legitimizing racist 
or biased stereotypes); Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Preju-
dice and the Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 643 (2003) (showing that people 
associate danger more frequently with African-American faces than Caucasian faces). 
 181 See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004) (showing that many people associate negative stereo-
types with black people); B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Con-
trolled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 183–86 
(2001) (showing that people often incorrectly perceive weapons in the hands of African-Americans 
1016 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:989 
bine this fact with an excessive force doctrine and qualified immunity doctrine 
that increasingly afford police the benefit of the doubt, and systemic injustices 
will flow, as recently shown.182 Furthermore, the Court has provided a way for 
police to make rash decisions and simultaneously hide behind the shield of 
qualified immunity in almost all deadly force occurrences.183 
Through combining an excessive force standard that benefits police, with 
a qualified immunity standard that requires extremely specific precedent, the 
Supreme Court has effectively biased lower courts against ever holding police 
officers liable.184 A plaintiff claiming a violation of § 1983 must prove their 
rights were violated and that every reasonable officer would have understood 
the officer’s actions in question to be a violation of those rights.185 Supposing a 
plaintiff can overcome such strong impediments and make it to the jury, the 
judge will instruct the jury to view the reasonableness of an officer’s acts 
through the eyes of a reasonable officer on the scene—another barrier to plain-
tiffs.186 While legitimate interests to justify the use of force do exist, the dan-
gers associated with being a police officer have been extremely exaggerated at 
the expense of individual’s rights and livelihoods.187 Nevertheless, qualified 
immunity has moved away from the idea of what one reasonable officer should 
have known to an almost impossible bar of what every reasonable officer 
should have known.188 Following changes in how these standards are applied, 
                                                                                                                           
when in actuality there is a phone or a tool); Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their 
Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 12 (1989) (showing 
that people often associate ambiguous behavior of African-Americans as aggressive, but do not per-
ceive the same behavior in Caucasians as aggressive). 
 182 See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text. 
 183 See Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 184 Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1773, 
1812 (2016). 
 185 See Blum et al., supra note 24, at 656; see also Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (requiring “that every 
reasonable official” know they were infringing upon someone’s rights). 
 186 See Geoffrey P. Alpert & William C. Smith, How Reasonable Is the Reasonable Man?: Police 
and Excessive Force, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 481, 486 (1994) (noting that juries are expected 
to decide if an officer’s actions were reasonable based on “subjective objectivity,” which has invaria-
bly led to confusion between what is reasonable or necessary); Blum, supra note 143, at 941 n.190 
(2015) (suggesting that the jury is given “unintelligible instructions” when determining an officer’s 
reasonableness and if they should be afforded qualified immunity); Harmon, supra note 173, at 1144–
45 (suggesting that jury instructions are not helpful to jurors in making reasonableness clearer). 
 187 See Gross, supra note 24, at 168 (showing that being a police officer is not as dangerous as 
commonly believed). 
 188 See Blum, supra note 185, at 655 (using the Supreme Court’s language in Harlow and Ash-
croft to show it may not have meant to change the language from a reasonable officer to every reason-
able official); Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117, 124 (2009) (stating qual-
ified immunity for officers is more like absolute immunity, and effectively allows such immunity 
barring the most heinous and outrageous police conduct); see, e.g., Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (using 
“every reasonable” officer); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (using “a reasonable” person). 
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the Court has been extremely hesitant to regulate any use of force by police 
officers largely due to distorted beliefs about policing dangers.189 
C. Embellishments and Overstatements of Policing Dangers 
It is undeniable that police officers need to use force to serve the legiti-
mate needs of law enforcement.190 Although some uses of force seem obvious, 
others are not as intuitive.191 Because the police are the practical means by 
which the government advances its own interests, the police are justified in 
using defensive force.192 Conversely, because police are fallible human agents, 
their justifications for use of force often exceed the government’s interests in 
allowing the use of such force.193 Injuries to police officers are extremely rare, 
yet the Court is fixated on protecting them.194 Although governments have 
substantial interests in maintaining safety for their officers and officials, they 
also have commensurate interests, if not stronger interests, in protecting the 
general public when their officials and officers abuse their power and violate 
the rights of citizens.195 In fact, police officers often use force offensively in-
stead of in self-defense, and do so with fluctuating levels of premeditation.196 
Allowing such abuses to persist unpunished leads to an erosion of public trust 
and confidence in the police, subsequently undermining the goals of criminal 
                                                                                                                           
 189 See Gross, supra note 24, at 161–62 (suggesting the Court has not altered its reasonableness 
doctrine due to “inaccurate assumptions regarding the nature of policing”). 
 190 See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 74 (stating that police need to use force to defend 
themselves and defend other citizens). 
 191 See Harmon, supra note 173, at 1150 (“[P]olice must be able to arrest individuals for serious 
crimes, even if they resist, and they must defend themselves from serious assault.”). Police obviously 
must defend themselves from physical attack, but pointing out an agreeable limit on the interest of 
using force is a murkier undertaking. Id. 
 192 See id. at 1155 (suggesting that if an officer did not concurrently serve the states interests by 
defending themselves, the state could contract away the right to self-defense on the job so that citizens 
could benefit from greater freedoms). 
 193 See id. at 1156 n.173 (citing numerous state statutes and cases that exempt police officers 
from a duty to retreat). 
 194 See Stoughton, supra note 170, at 849. A considerable amount of assaults on police officers result 
in either minor injuries, or no injuries at all. See Table 70: Law Enforcement Officers Assaulted, FBI, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/leoka/leoka-2010/tables/table70-leo-assaulted-type-weapon-
percent-injured-01-10.xls [https://perma.cc/8VQC-ABEK] (showing that in the last fifteen years, 
71.7% to 74.1% of assaults on police resulted in no injuries or minor injuries). 
 195 See Harmon, supra note 173, at 1157 (suggesting that a breakdown in trust between law en-
forcement and the communities they patrol can result in a loss of police legitimacy and increased 
violence). 
 196 See Stoughton, supra note 170, at 868 (suggesting police are more often the aggressive party 
when use of force is involved). The Court’s reasoning in Graham v. Connor that police often face 
situations that are “tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,” is so overbroad and ambiguous that it is 
applicable to any stressful situation like a law school exam, or even a poker game. Graham v. Connor 
(Graham III), 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); see Stoughton, supra note 170, at 868 n.143. 
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law and reducing community cooperation with the law.197 Even the “Presi-
dent’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing” acknowledged that the current 
culture of policing needs to be changed from a militaristic approach to a pro-
tective approach so that trust in the community can be restored.198 
A common perception exists that being a police officer is a highly dan-
gerous job.199 Although police officers can face dangerous situations, the dan-
gers commonly associated with their jobs, specifically self-defense responses 
to dangerous criminals, are highly exaggerated.200 According to a 2016 study 
conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, more officers die on the job 
accidently than due to felonious activity.201 As a matter of fact, truck drivers, 
                                                                                                                           
 197 See Robert J. Kane, Compromised Police Legitimacy as a Predictor of Violent Crime in Struc-
turally Disadvantaged Communities, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 469, 490–92 (2005) (finding that police mis-
conduct and increased policing in disadvantaged communities is directly correlated with violent 
crime, and suggests that police departments focus on accountability instead of over-policing disadvan-
taged communities); Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: The Benefits of Self-Regulation, 
7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 312–13, 315 (2009) (discussing the need for, and benefits of, cooperation 
between law enforcement and the communities they serve, and the importance of legitimacy in a po-
licing context); Melissa Hung, Low-Income PoCs Still Don’t Trust the Police, but Would Work with 
Them, NPR (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/02/22/515820280/low-
income-pocs-still-don-t-trust-the-police-but-would-work-with-them [https://perma.cc/WE5V-6YX3] 
(discussing a recent study’s findings that although citizens in high-crime, high-poverty areas are skep-
tical of police, they are not reluctant to cooperate with police for increased community safety); Jim 
Norman, Confidence in Police Back at Historical Average, GALLUP (July 10, 2017), http://news.
gallup.com/poll/213869/confidence-police-back-historical-average.aspx [https://perma.cc/HM2B-
72AU] (noting that although confidence in police has risen to the twenty-five year average of fifty-
seven percent from a record-tying low of fifty-two percent in 2015, a strong lack of confidence exists 
among African Americans, Hispanics, liberals, and people younger than thirty-five). 
 198 PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT 11 (2015), https://ric-
zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p311-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/LV4G-HYH8]. 
 199 See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo, Shoot First, and He’ll Answer Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2015, 
at A1 (discussing how a popular police-aligned expert witness consistently testifies that police face a 
high level threat, irrespective of other experts and scholars calling his research “pseudoscience” and 
“lacking in both foundation and reliability”); Dean Scoville, The Hazards of Traffic Stops: Pulling 
Over a Motorist Can Result in a Citation or a Raging Gun Battle. You Have to Be Prepared for Either 
One., POLICE MAG. (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2010/10/duty-
dangers-traffic-stops.aspx [https://perma.cc/GWS2-P9KA] (describing the traffic stop as “one of the 
most dangerous aspects of police work”). 
 200 See Radley Balko, Once Again: Police Work Is NOT Getting More Dangerous, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/10/02/once-again-police-
work-is-not-getting-more-dangerous/?utm_term=.c64913465a58 [https://perma.cc/M58F-RMZB] 
(showing that being a police officer is an increasingly safe profession, especially in recent years); see 
also David Feige, The Myth of the Hero Cop, SLATE (May 25, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news_and_politics/politics/2015/05/the_myth_of_the_hero_cop_police_unions_have_spread_a_
dangerous_message_about.html [https://perma.cc/NSF9-AFU3] (“Police officers earn more than you 
think for a job that’s less dangerous than you imagine.”). 
 201 Compare FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed: Type of Weapon, 2007–2016 
(2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2016/officers-feloniously-killed/tables/table-1.xls [https://perma.cc/
QUZ9-6LXB] (showing that from 2007 through 2016, 470 law enforcement officers were killed with 
firearms, 166 of which involved an incident where officers had prior knowledge that a firearm was 
involved), with FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Accidentally Killed: Circumstance at Scene of Inci-
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farmers, construction workers, and even grounds maintenance workers all in-
dividually accounted for more on the job deaths than total police officer deaths 
in 2016.202 Still, many people cling to the belief that routine traffic stops are 
the most dangerous aspect of a police officer’s job, demanding the greatest 
degree of precaution and protection.203 Notwithstanding, recent statistics and 
studies seem to tell a different, less perilous story.204 In 2011, police officers 
were eighteen times more likely to die during an arrest than during a traffic 
stop.205 Even then, it is extremely unlikely for an officer to be killed on the 
job.206 In fact, data suggests that being a police officer has gotten increasingly 
safer over time, with 2015 being one of the safest years ever for police offic-
                                                                                                                           
dent, 2007–2016 (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2016/officers-accidentally-killed/tables/table-64.xls 
[https://perma.cc/6AF4-E5YJ] (showing that from 2007 through 2016, 563 law enforcement officers 
were accidently killed on the job). 
 202 Compare BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL 
INJURIES IN 2016, at 3 chart 3 (2017), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8X5C-QEF8] (showing fatal work injuries by profession for 2016), with FBI, Law Enforcement Offic-
ers Feloniously Killed: Region, Geographic Division, and State, 2007–2016 (2017), https://ucr.fbi.
gov/leoka/2016/officers-feloniously-killed/tables/table-1.xls [https://perma.cc/4EUM-BSCQ] (show-
ing that sixty-six officers died from felonious activity in 2016), and FBI, Law Enforcement Officers 
Accidentally Killed: Region, Geographic Division, and State, 2007–2016 (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/
leoka/2016/officers-accidentally-killed/tables/table-47.xls [https://perma.cc/RA32-XDBZ] (showing 
that fifty-two officers died accidently in 2016). 
 203 See, e.g., Scoville, supra note 199. In 1977, the Supreme Court agreed with this line of reason-
ing in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, when it discussed the “inordinate risk” officers face when approaching 
a car during a traffic stop, suggesting that traffic stops are more dangerous than other types of con-
frontations. 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977). Although the Court cited a study suggesting that thirty percent 
of police shootings occur when an officer is approaching a vehicle, the Court did not discuss how 
often those officers spend their time conducting traffic stops in comparison to other policing duties. 
See id.; Gross, supra note 176, at 169. When you factor in that police spend a large proportion of their 
time conducting traffic stops, thirty percent is much less perilous in actuality. See Gross, supra note 
176, at 169. 
 204 See FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed: Circumstance at Scene of Incident, 
2007–2016 (2017), https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2016/officers-feloniously-killed/tables/table-23.xls 
[https://perma.cc/FTR3-63GX] (showing that four police officers were feloniously killed during traf-
fic stops in 2016). Compare Lynn Langton & Matthew Durose, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POLICE BE-
HAVIOR DURING TRAFFIC AND STREET STOPS, 2011, at 10 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/pbtss11.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN3N-LGRP] (showing that police were involved in over 
26,000,000 traffic stops, and of those stops, 75% of drivers who were subjected to police use of force 
thought the force was unnecessary, and 33% thought the force was excessive), with FBI, Law En-
forcement Officers Feloniously Killed: Circumstance at Scene of Incident, 2002–2011 (2012), 
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/leoka/2011/tables/table-19 [https://perma.cc/346L-B7AE] 
(showing that eleven police officers were feloniously killed during traffic stops in 2011). 
 205 Gross, supra note 176, at 169; see Langton, supra note 204, at 2 (showing that police conduct-
ed over 3,000,000 arrests in 2011); FBI, Law Enforcement Officers Feloniously Killed: Circumstance 
at Scene of Incident, 2002–2011, supra note 204 (showing that twenty-three officers were feloniously 
killed during arrests). 
 206 See Gross, supra note 176, at 169. (showing that officers have a 0.00077% chance of being 
killed while making an arrest, and 0.00004% chance of being killed during a traffic stop). 
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ers.207 Nonetheless, the perceived dangers of policing remain central to law 
enforcement training, with officers taught to shoot before a threat is fully real-
ized, because hesitations supposedly can be fatal.208 These practices and mis-
conceptions led to what Justice Sotomayor labeled a “shoot first, think later 
approach” adopted by police officers, which has abolished Fourth Amendment 
rights for anyone harmed by police officers.209 
D. Amended Qualified Immunity and Excessive Force  
Standards Are Not Out of Reach 
The Supreme Court conceded that it entirely reframed the doctrine of 
qualified immunity, abandoning common law principles along the way.210 
Even Justice Thomas, someone not often considered a champion of civil rights, 
suggested that qualified immunity should more closely align with common law 
principles that were in effect when the forty-second Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871.211 Other sitting justices expressed concern by either con-
                                                                                                                           
 207 Gross, supra note 176, at 169; see Daniel Bier, It Has Never Been Safer to Be a Cop, 
NEWSWEEK (Sept. 14, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/it-has-never-been-safer-be-cop-372025 
[https://perma.cc/3THB-98PQ]. In the last decade, police fatalities decreased when measured per 
resident, per police officer, and in totality. See Bier, supra; Christopher Ingraham, It’s Official: There 
Never Was a ‘War on Cops,’ WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2015/12/30/its-official-there-never-was-a-war-on-cops/?utm_term=.1115d262f0d1 [https://
perma.cc/6KW4-4VDB] (stating that aside from an aberration in 2013, 2015 was the safest year for 
police officers since 1887). 
 208 See Seth Stoughton, How Police Training Contributes to Avoidable Deaths, THE ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/police-gun-shooting-training-
ferguson/383681/ [https://perma.cc/JH7J-W6A3] (suggesting that police training is a big part of the 
problem). “[O]fficers are taught that the risks of mistake are less—far less—than the risks of hesita-
tion.” Id. There is a common saying among police officers that it’s “[b]etter to be judged by twelve 
than carried by six.” Id. 
 209 Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. at 316 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 210 See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 645 (stating that the Court in Harlow substituted subjective malice 
considerations that were required at common law with an objective legal reasonableness test, which 
“completely reformulated qualified immunity along principles not at all embodied in the common 
law”). 
 211 See Ziglar v. Abassi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1871 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the 
Court’s current qualified immunity jurisprudence embodies “precisely the sort of ‘freewheeling policy 
choice[s]’ that we have previously disclaimed the power to make” (quoting Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 
U.S. 356, 366 (2012))); Perry Grossman, Clarence Thomas to the Rescue?, SLATE (June 21, 2017), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/06/in-ziglar-v-abbasi-clarence-thomas-signals-his-support-
for-civil-rights-plaintiffs.html [https://perma.cc/8JDL-W2JF] (suggesting that Justice Thomas is not 
typically the champion for civil rights, and saying his concurrence is the most radical call to change 
qualified immunity doctrine to date). But see generally District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 
(2018) (illustrating that Justice Thomas applied the doctrine of qualified immunity while writing for 
the majority, less than one year after his strong concurrence in Ziglar). Justices Ginsburg and So-
tomayor wrote concurrences in Wesby, providing ample opportunity for Justice Thomas to join con-
currences. See generally 138 S. Ct. at 593 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 593–94 (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring). In Ziglar, Justice Thomas stated that the balancing test between constitutional rights and 
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curring or dissenting on issues of qualified immunity, so altering the doctrine 
of qualified immunity is possible.212 
Allowing § 1983 plaintiffs the ability to use an officer’s malice to defeat 
qualified immunity claims is not an unreasonable retraction, and something the 
Court can amend.213 After all, it was the Supreme Court that granted an ability 
to use an officer’s malice in § 1983 claims, and the Supreme Court that subse-
quently took that possibility away.214 Further, allowing lower courts the ability 
to clearly establish laws and recognize constitutional violations irrespective of 
equivalent cases on point is attainable with at least one recently appointed jus-
tice.215 When courts decide cases that involve constitutional rights in the polic-
ing context, police departments change their internal policies to correspond 
with the rulings.216 This is a powerful tool for progressive change, but the Su-
preme Court has been reluctant to use internal policies in their own calcula-
tions of reasonableness.217 Qualified immunity is a common law doctrine, so 
the Court is in the best position to amend it—especially since other branches of 
government have proved unreliable at effecting positive change.218 
                                                                                                                           
effective performance of governmental duties is one that the Constitution assigns to Congress, not the 
judiciary. 137 S. Ct. at 1849. 
 212 See, e.g., Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 593 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (Thom-
as, J., concurring); Mullenix IV, 136 S. Ct. 305, 315 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Wyatt v. Cole, 504 
U.S. 158, 169–75 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 213 See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 210 (2001) (illustrating the Court has included the subjec-
tive intent of an officer in previous decisions); see also infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 214 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975) (including a subjective element and objec-
tive element); Graham III, 490 U.S. at 397 (stating that an officer’s malice may not be taken into 
consideration). 
 215 See, e.g., Holmes, 830 F.3d at 1169 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (saying it was clearly established 
that a cop could not arrest a student for burping in class because precedent did not allow for arresting 
students for other minor classroom distractions, and ultimately concluding that any reasonable officer 
would have known that this was a step too far). 
 216 See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 18 (2016) 
(showing that after the Fourth Circuit deemed tasing people on “drive-stun mode” unconstitutional, 
agencies within the Fourth Circuit amended their use of force and taser policies). 
 217 See City and Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777 (2015) (reasoning that 
“[e]ven if an officer acts contrary to her training[,] . . . that does not itself negate qualified immunity 
where it would otherwise be warranted”); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 n.7 (2004) (stating that 
an officer’s training may put him on notice, but then explaining that the Court “do[es] not suggest that 
an official is deprived of qualified immunity whenever he violates an internal guideline”). 
 218 See Christian Sheckler & Ken Armstrong, Who Will Now Police the Police?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 2, 2018, at SR3 (showing how attorney general Jeff Sessions heavily restricted the Justice De-
partment’s power to address police abuses); Gross, supra note 176, at 163–64 (suggesting that legisla-
tors are too deferential to police officers, and that police departments are ill suited to address police 
misconduct). Legislators have gone in the wrong direction, taking steps to increase protections for 
police officers. See id. at 164. 
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CONCLUSION 
Congress once passed legislation aimed at protecting citizens from police 
violence, especially black citizens who faced repeated and continuous injustic-
es by the very police officers charged with protecting them. The true benefits 
of this legislation were short lived however, and victims of police abuse are 
subsequently left helpless. News outlets and social media platforms have 
helped shed light on these once unbelievable injustices, yet the Supreme Court 
relies on the same antiquated excuses, allowing these crimes to persist with 
impunity. Police departments and their advocates focus on the legitimate need 
for officers to use force in defending the government’s interests, which undeni-
ably exist. But when the legislation became effective, the Court was already 
supposed to balance legitimate government interests with individual citizens’ 
interest in their own constitutional rights. 
Even so, the Supreme Court’s stated policy goals for qualified immunity 
in the policing context have largely gone unmet. Considering these repeated 
failures, the fact that being a police officer is not as dangerous as commonly 
believed, and that unarmed civilians continue being killed by police in unrea-
sonable circumstances, it is past time for the Court to amend its jurisprudence 
of qualified immunity and police use of force. In its current form, an irrational 
fear of a black man can be weaponized into an excuse for murdering an inno-
cent citizen. It was the Court that created this confusing and messy line of case 
law, and it is the Court’s responsibility to finally clean up after itself. 
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